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Abstract
This article explores the policy bases for, and the political economy of, the law’s
long-standing discrimination against corporate political speech. This Article also
explores the relevance of state law regulation of corporate political speech to the
competition between the states for corporate charters. In the process, implications
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over enacting an optional federal corporate takeover law regime and creating a
securities law regulatory competition are noted. The underlying aim of this Ar-
ticle is to bring to bear on the relevant policy debates a shift in focus from the
shareholder/manager agency relationship to the agency relationship between law-
makers and society. The Article draws on the contractarian view of the firm, the
economic theory of regulation, and the study of public choice.
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Corporate Political Speech, Political Extortion, and the 
Competition for Corporate Charters 
Robert H. Sitkoff† 
This Article explores the policy bases for, and the political economy of, the law’s long-standing 
discrimin ation against corporate political speech. This Article also explores the relevance of state law 
regulation of corporate political speech to the competition between the states for corporate charters. 
The underlying aim of this Article is to bring to bear on the relevant policy debates a shift in focus from 
the sh areholder/manager agency relationship to the agency relationship between lawmakers and society. 
The Article draws on the contractarian view of the firm, the economic theory of regulation, and the 
study of public choice. 
INTRODUCTION 
With the passage of the Tillman Act1 in 1907, Congress made it a 
crime for corporations to make financial contributions to candidates for 
federal office. In its present form, 2 USC § 441b, the Act bars not only di-
rect corporate “contributions” to the campaigns of federal political candi-
dates, but also corporate “independent expenditures” on their behalf.2 
Analogous restrictions appear in the election codes of about thirty states,3 
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1  Pub L No 59-36, 34 Stat 864, ch 420 (1907). 
2 2 USC § 441b (1997). “Independent expenditures” is a campaign finance term of art that refers 
to the act of funding speech that, although advocating the election or defeat of a specific candidate, is 
nevertheless uncoordinated with any specific candidate’s campaign. See Buckley v Valeo, 424 US 1, 19–
23 (1976) (per curiam) (explaining the difference between “contributions” and “independent expendi-
tures”). By focusing on direct contributions and independent expenditures, these restrictions relate only 
to “hard money.” The practice of donating money to political parties, which is in contrast commonly 
called “soft money,” remains largely unregulated. See Mariani v United States, 212 F3d 761, 767–69 
(3d Cir 2000) (en banc); Note, Soft Money: The Current Rules and the Case for Reform , 111 Harv L Rev 
1323, 1324–26 (1998). See also Part IV.A. 
3 See Edward D. Feigenbaum and James A. Palmer, Campaign Finance Law 2000: A Summary 
of State Campaign Finance Laws with Quick Reference Charts Chart 2-A (2000), available online at 
Hosted by The Berkeley Electronic Press
2 Competition for Corporate Charters 
and these state statutes have a similarly venerable historical pedigree.4 The 
vintage of this regula tion of corporate polit ical speech distinguishes it from 
most modern campaign finance regulation, which for the most part traces its 
roots to the Watergate era.5 The regulation of corporate political speech is 
also distinguished by its severity. Since Buck ley v Valeo,6 the Supreme 
Court has struck down every limitation on independent expenditures that it 
has reviewed except for one: the absolute ban contained in section 441b.7  
This Article explores the underlying policy bases for, and the political 
economy of, the law’s ongoing discrimination against corporate political 
speech. This Article also explores the relevance of the state law discrimina-
tion against corporate political speech for the corporate regulatory competi-
tion debate. Putting the First Amendment policy issues to one side,8 the un-
                                                                                                                 
<http://www.fec.gov/pages/cfll00chart2A.htm> (visited Aug 14, 2001). See also Susan L. Ross, Note, 
Corporate Speech on Political Issues: The First Amendment in Conflict with Democratic Ideals? , 1985 
U Ill L Rev 445, 470–72 (1985). An examination of Feigenbaum and Palmer’s Chart 2-A reveals that a 
substantial number of states continues to regulate corporate political speech more severely than that of 
individuals. 
4 Earl R. Sikes, State and Federal Corrupt Practices Legislation  279–83 (Duke 1928) (listing 
states that prohibited corporate contributions near the turn of the century). 
5 See Robert E. Mutch, Campaigns, Congress, and the Courts: The Making of Federal Cam-
paign Finance Law xvii (Praeger 1988) (calling the Tillman Act the “first federal campaign finance 
law”). 
6 424 US 1 (1976) (per curiam). 
7 Although the Court has not reviewed the constitutionality of 2 USC § 441b as applied to busi-
ness corporations, it has upheld a state law modeled on section 441b, Austin v Michigan Chamber of 
Commerce, 494 US 652, 655 n 1 (1990), and there is no reason to suppose that section 441b would be 
treated any differently. See Beaumont v FEC, 278 F3d 261, 278 (4th Cir 2002) (declining to find section 
441b facially unconstitutional); Mariani v United States, 212 F3d 761, 772–73 (3d Cir 2000) (en banc) 
(rejecting a constitutional challenge to section 441b). See also Athens Lumber Co v FEC, 718 F2d 363, 
363 (11th Cir 1983) (en banc) (per curiam) (finding section 441b constitutional). But see Montana 
Chamber of Commerce v Argenbright, 226 F3d 1049, 1057–58 (9th Cir 2000) (finding that a Montana 
initiative prohibiting direct corporate expenditures in ballot initiative campaigns violated the First 
Amendment). 
8 See, for example, Thomas W. Joo, The Modern Corporation and Campaign Finance: Incorp o-
rating Corporate Governance Analysis into First Amendment Jurisprudence, 79 Wash U L Q 1 (2001); 
Martin H. Redish, Money Talks 63–114 (NYU 2001); Adam Winkler, The Corporation in Election Law, 
32 Loyola LA L Rev 1243 (1999); Martin H. Redish and Howard M. Wasserman, What’s Good for Gen-
eral Motors: Corporate Speech and the Theory of Free Expression, 66 Geo Wash L Rev 235 (1998); 
Daniel J.H. Greenwood, Essential Speech: Why Corporate Speech Is Not Free , 83 Iowa L Rev 995 
(1998); Henry N. Butler and Larry E. Ribstein, The Corporation and the Constitution 59–78 (AEI 
1995); Alan J. Meese, Limitations on Corporate Speech: Protection for Shareholders or Abridgement of 
Expression?, 2 Wm & Mary Bill Rts J 305 (1993); Larry E. Ribstein, Corporate Political Speech, 49 
Wash & Lee L Rev 109 (1992); Daniel Hays Lowenstein, A Patternless Mosaic: Campaign Finance and 
the First Amendment after Austin, 21 Cap U L Rev 381 (1992); Nicole Bremner Casarez, Corruption, 
Corrosion, and Corporate Political Speech , 70 Neb L Rev 689 (1991); Miriam Cytryn, Comment, De-
fining the Specter of Corru ption: Austin v. Michigan State Chamber of Commerce, 57 Brooklyn L Rev 
903 (1991); Jill E. Fisch, Frankenstein’s Monster Hits the Campaign Trail: An Approach to Regulation 
of Corporate Political Expenditures, 32 Wm & Mary L Rev 587 (1991); David Shelledy, Autonomy, 
Debate, and Corporate Speech , 18 Hastings Const L Q 541 (1991); Michael J. Merrick, The Saga Con-
tinues—Corporate Political Free Speech and the Constitutionality of Campaign Finance Reform: Austin 
v. Michigan Chamber of Commerce, 24 Creighton L Rev 195 (1990); Ross, Note, 1985 U Ill L Rev 445 
(cited in note 3); C. Edwin Baker, Realizing Self-Realization: Corporate Political Expenditures and Re-
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derlying aim of this Article is to shift the focus of the relevant policy de-
bates from the shareholder/manager agency relationship to the soci-
ety/lawmaker agency relationship,9 analysis of the latter being informed by 
the study of public choice.10 Specifically, this Article advances four claims 
in its four Parts. The latter three represent the Article’s more original contri-
butions to the existing literature. 
In Part I, drawing on the contractarian approach to the study of  corpo-
rate governance,11 this Article contends that the conventional justifications 
for discriminating against corporate political speech are generally unpersua-
sive. To the extent that they depend on a significant divergence of interests 
between shareholders and managers (and most do), the conventional justif i-
cations are vulnerable on that ground. There is nothing special about the 
agency problem associated with managerial control over corporate political 
speech that distinguishes it from any other area of managerial discretion. 
Hence, there is no obvious reason to abandon the usual tools of corporate 
governance in favor of a mandatory rule and criminalization.  
The only argument growing out of the conventional approaches to this 
issue that does not depend on significant shareholder/manager agency costs 
is the fear of managerial lobbying for redistributive legislation—that is, 
corporate rent seeking. This concern has purchase because redistributive 
corporate rent seeking is socially undesirable and yet rational investors 
might favor it. Drawing on the relevant collective action dynamics and the 
economic theory of regulation,12 this Article contends that the only plausible 
part of the conventional justif ication for discriminating against corporate 
                                                                                                                 
dish’s The Value of Free Speech, 130 U Pa L Rev 646 (1982); Victor Brudney, Business Corporations 
and Stockholders’ Rights under the First Amendment, 91 Yale L J 235 (1981); John R. Bolton, Constitu-
tional Limitations on Restricting Corporate and Union Political Speech , 22 Ariz L Rev 373 (1980); 
Loren A. Smith, Business, Buck$ & Bull: The Corporation, the First Amendment & the Corrupt Pra c-
tices Law, 4 Del J Corp L 39 (1978); David A. Grossberg, Comment, The Constitutionality of the Fed-
eral Ban on Corporate and Union Campaign Contributions and Expenditures, 42 U Chi L Rev 148 
(1974); Jeremiah D. Lambert, Corporate Political Spending and Campaign Finance, 40 NYU L Rev 
1033 (1965); Edwin M. Epstein, Corporations, Contributions, and Political Campaigns: Federal Regu-
lation in Perspective  (Berkeley 1958). 
9 Agency is used here as an economic rather than a legal term of art. See, for example, Michael 
C. Jensen and William H. Meckling, Theory of the Firm: Managerial Behavior, Agency Costs, and 
Ownership Structure, 3 J Fin Econ 305, 308 (1976) (setting forth an economic defin ition of agency and 
defining “agency costs” as the sum of the various losses that stem from the misalignment of interests be-
tween principal and agent). 
10 See generally Daniel A. Farber and Philip P. Frickey, Law and Public Choice: A Critical Intro-
duction  12–37 (Chicago 1991) (examining the public choice literature on interest groups and lawmak-
ers). 
11 The classic exposition is Frank H. Easterbrook and Daniel R. Fischel, The Economic Structure 
of Corporate Law (Harvard 1991). 
12 See James Buchanan and Gordon Tullock, The Calculus of Consent (Michigan 1962); Mancur 
Olson, Jr., The Logic of Collective Action: Public Goods and the Theory of Groups (Harvard 1965); 
George J. Stigler, The Theory of Economic Regulation, 2 Bell J Econ & Mgmt Sci 3 (1971); Sam Pelt z-
man, Toward a More General Theory of Regulation, 19 J L & Econ 211 (1976); Gary S. Becker, A The-
ory of Competition among Pressure Groups for Political Influence, 98 Q J Econ 371 (1983).  
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political speech is that doing so might represent an appropriate response to 
the competitive advantages provided by the corporate form in the market 
for legislation. It is an argument, in other words, that corporations might be 
particularly pernicious rent seekers. This possibly might justify discriminat-
ing against corporate political speech. Crucially, the basis of this concern is 
not the agency between managers and shareholders, but rather a public 
choice view of the agency between lawmakers and society.  
Part II offers a political economy story for the Tillman Act’s enactment 
that is consistent with the notion, advanced in Part I, that the corporate form 
might provide competitive advantages in the market for legislation. Part II 
contends that the statutes were probably supported by corporations, and this 
for two reasons. First, again drawing on the relevant collective action dy-
namics and the economic theory of regulation, Part II suggests that the stat-
utes represent a solution to the collective action problem faced by individ-
ual corporations if the redistributive lobbying by corporations as a class for 
the most part victimized other corporations. For if corporate political activ-
ity represents both offensive and defensive lobbying anent redistributive 
legislation, then corporations as a class might do better with a flat ban on 
corporate campaign contributions. On this view, the statutes solve the col-
lective action problem by enforcing concerted action.  
Second, drawing on a fresh look at the historical record in view of the 
modern learning on the economic theory of regulation,13 Part II contends 
that the statutes might lessen the ability of elected officials to extort corpo-
rations (and thus by extension shareholders), because they proscribe the 
most direct forms of support. That is, the statutes might weaken the ability 
of elected officials to extract campaign donations from corporations by 
threatening and then forbearing from legislative action that would be harm-
ful to the interests of those corporations. Thus, even if these laws facilitate 
rather than frustrateattempts by large corporations to seek rents through re-
distributive legislation (by reducing corporate exposure to extortive ultima-
tums), the statutes may still be defended on the alternative ground that by 
preventing extortion they preserve the socially desirable incentive for inno-
vation. The statutes ensure that the increased profits which stem from that 
innovation flow to shareholders rather than elected officials. 
Part III assimilates the modern learning on the economic theory of 
regulation into the corporate regulatory competition debate and in the proc-
ess further develops the existing literature’s application of the traditional 
model. The aim of Part III is to offer a more nuanced approach to evaluat-
                                                                                                                 
13 See Fred S. McChesney, Money for Nothing: Politicians, Rent Extraction, and Political Exto r-
tion 12–13 (Harvard 1997); Fred S. McChesney, Rent Extraction and Rent Creation in the Economic 
Theory of Regulation , 16 J Legal Stud 101 (1987). See also Fred S. McChesney, “Pay to Play” Politics 
Examined, with Lessons for Campaign-Finance Reform , 6 Indep Rev 345 (2002). Compare David A. 
Strauss, Corru ption, Equality, and Campaign Finance Reform, 94 Colum L Rev 1369, 1380–82 (1994); 
David A. Strauss, What Is the Goal of Campaign Finance Reform?, 1995 U Chi Legal F 141, 152–55. 
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ing the comparative advantage in the competition for corporate charters 
provided by Delaware’s unique political economy. Specifically, Part III con-
tends that the political economy of the Tillman Act and its state law ana-
logues suggested in Part II is consistent with the fact that Delaware, the 
dominant state of incorporation for most large, publicly traded corporations, 
is among the minority of states that does not discriminate against corporate 
political speech. Part III also contends that, in view of the modern learning 
on the economic theory of regulation, Delaware’s lack of any corporation-
specific campaign finance regulation, coupled with certain unique institu-
tional features of the Delaware corporate lawmaking process, gives addi-
tional traction to the “credible commitment” explanation for Delaware’s 
ongoing dominance in the competition for corporate cha rters.14  
Finally, Part IV discusses the implications of the foregoing analysis for 
three current policy debates. First, Part IV briefly discusses the current po-
litical debate over whether to ban corporate (and other) soft-money dona-
tions. Second, Part IV briefly discusses the burgeoning academic debate 
about issuer choice of law in securities regulation. Finally, Part IV ends 
with a comprehensive analysis of the pertinence of this Article to the cur-
rent academic debate over the enactment of an optional federal corporate 
takeover law regime. This more comprehensive analysis may be viewed as 
a case study, as it were, in the application of this Article’s analysis to other 
problems. 
I.  WHY DISCRIMINATE AGAINST CORPORATE POLITICAL SPEECH? 
The usual policy justifications for section 441b and its state analogues, 
as adduced by legislators,15 courts,16 and commentators,17 can be separated 
                                                                                                                 
14 The “credible commitment” explanation is most closely associated with Roberta Romano. See 
Roberta Romano, Law as a Product: Some Pieces of the Incorporation Puzzle, 1 J L, Econ, & Org 225 
(1985); Roberta Romano, The State Competition Debate in Corporate Law, 8 Cardozo L Rev 709, 721–
24 (1987); Roberta Romano, The Genius of American Corporate Law 37–38 (AEI 1993) (“Delaware’s 
preeminence in the corporate charter market results from its ability to resolve credibly the commitment 
problem in relational contracting.”). 
15 Note the reference to “legislators,” not “legislatures.” The difference is important, because I do 
not wish to suggest that legislation is necessarily the product of a unified and public-regarding legisla-
tive effort. See generally William M. Landes and Richard A. Posner, The Independent Judiciary in an 
Interest-Group Perspective, 18 J L & Econ 875, 876 (1975) (“[P]ublic policy emerges from the struggle 
of interest groups.”); Frank H. Easterbrook, Statutes’ Domains, 50 U Chi L Rev 533, 547 (1983) (claim-
ing that legislatures do not have intents or designs); Jonathan R. Macey, Promoting Public-Regarding 
Legislation through Statutory Interpretation: An Interest Group Model, 86 Colum L Rev 223, 227–33 
(1986) (describing how legislation is a product of interest group deals).  
16 The critical modern decisions are Austin v Michigan Chamber of Commerce, 494 US 652 
(1990); FEC v Massachusetts Citizens for Life, Inc, 479 US 238, 245–46, 255 (1986); FEC v National 
Right to Work Committee, 459 US 197, 201 (1982); First National Bank of Boston v Bellotti, 435 US 
765, 776 (1977).  
17 See note 8. Perhaps the most influential commentator has been Professor Victor Brudney. See 
Brudney, 91 Yale L J 235 (cited in note 8) (discussing the regulation of corporate polit ical speech). An 
Austin  concurrence cited him authoritatively, see Austin , 494 US at 675 (Brennan concurring), citing 
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into two categories: first, that corporate donations produce bad politics, and 
second, that corporate donations harm shareholders. Hence the first is usu-
ally perceived as a political problem whereas the second is usually per-
ceived as a problem of corporate governance. As we shall see, however, in a 
world without shareholder/manager agency costs much (though not all) of 
the distinction between the two strands collapses.18 Still, there is pedagogi-
cal utility to the distinction, and it will be followed here. 
A. Bad Politics 
There are two variations on the argument that corporate political 
speech produces bad politics. The first depends on irrational investors 
and/or a gross misalignment of interests between shareholders and manag-
ers, whereas the second depends on a misalignment of interests between so-
ciety and lawmakers. This Part contends that the second variant has far 
more cogency than the first. Indeed, except for a fear of the competitive ad-
vantages in rent seeking afforded by the corporate form (for in rent seeking 
the interests of shareholders and society diverge and one need not suppose 
irrational investors), the bad politics argument amounts to nothing more 
than a complaint that people with more money can buy more speech. But 
that is no reason to limit all corporate political speech. It is rather an argu-
ment either for limiting the political speech of all the wealthy, including 
people and other business associations in addition to corporations, or for 
subsidizing the political speech of the poor. This leaves only the fear of 
corporate rent seeking—and the society/lawmaker agency problem that 
animates it—as a plausible justification for discriminating against corporate 
polit ical speech with a mandatory prohibition. 
1. “Immense wealth” and “special advantages.” 
The first bad politics justification for discriminating against corporate 
political speech, to borrow the articulation of the Supreme Court in Austin v 
Michigan Chamber of Commerce,19 is that the state endows corporations 
with “special advantages,” such as “limited liability, perpetual life, and fa-
vorable treatment of the accumulation and distribution of assets,” that when 
taken together permit corporations to amass “immense aggregations of 
wealth . . . that have little or no correlation to the public’s support for the 
corporation’s political ideas.”20 So restrictions on corporate speech, the the-
                                                                                                                 
Brudney, 91 Yale L J at 247, and nearly all of the commentary addresses his views.  
18 See generally Jensen and Meckling, 3 J Fin Econ at 309–10 (cited in note 9) (defining agency 
costs with respect to corporate law); Adolf A. Berle, Jr. and Gardiner C. Means, The Modern Corpora-
tion and Private Property (MacMillan 1932) (exploring the “separation of ownership and control” in 
large business corporations). 
19 494 US 652 (1990). 
20 Id at 658–59. 
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ory goes, offset the “unique state-conferred corporate structure that facili-
tates the amassing of large treasuries.”21 The implicit premise of this ration-
ale is the idea that, without government regulation, corporations would in 
fact deploy their “large treasuries” in the political marketplace in such force 
as to become a “corrosive and distorting” influence on elections.22  
But managers who divert corporate resources from profit-making ac-
tivities towards funding political campaigns on such a grand level as to war-
rant the characterization “corrosive and distorting” will find their firm’s 
“large treasuries” shrinking as the firm becomes less competitive in its 
product and the capital markets.23 And perpetual life cuts in precisely the 
opposite direction than the Court supposed—it solves the “last period” 
problem. As a class, managers must always look forward to tomorrow’s 
product and capital market competition.24  
True, limited liability does help managers obtain capital. But it does so 
only by capping investors’ personal liability to creditors of the corporation 
at the amount of the investors’ investment. Limited liability does not shield 
the corporation itself from liability for its debts.25 So to suppose that limited 
liability will help an incorporated firm amass a huge treasury for use in 
electoral campaigns is to suppose investor irrationality. Who would invest 
in a company that, rather than promising handsome returns, merely hands 
over the corporate treasury to political candidates? The answer is only those 
investors who prefer the corporation’s political speech over larger dividends 
or stock price appreciation—unless, as discussed below, the political activ-
ity represents narrowly targeted rent seeking that increases the firm’s prof-
its, or unless the market is uninformed about campaign donations and so 
cannot police managers. Putting the former qualific ation to one side for the 
moment, the latter does not damage the thesis. That scenario, if it were ac-
curate, at best argues for disclosure rather than dollar limitations as a legis-
lative solution.26 For in a thick capital market in which that information was 
known, the fact of the corporation’s political donations would be im-
                                                                                                                 
21 Id at 660. See also FEC v Massachusetts Citizens for Life, Inc, 479 US 238, 257–59 (1986); 
FEC v National Right to Work Committee, 459 US 197, 207–08 (1982); Beaumont v FEC, 278 F3d 261, 
271–72 (4th Cir 2002). 
22 Austin , 494 US at 660. See notes 67–68 and accompanying text. 
23 Butler and Ribstein, The Corporation and the Constitution at 72–73 (cited in note 8).  
24 Individual managers close to retirement, however, may not. But that is an agency problem. See 
Part II.B.  
25 On limited liability, see Frank H. Easterbrook and Daniel R. Fischel, Limited Liability, 52 U 
Chi L Rev 89, 89–90 (1985); Easterbrook and Fischel, Economic Structure  at 40–41 (cited in note 11); 
Chester Rohrlich, Organizing Corporate and Other Business Enterprises § 5.02 at 175–76 (Matthew 
Bender 1999). 
26 See Cynthia A. Williams, The Securities and Exchange Commission and Corporate Social Re-
sponsibility, 112 Harv L Rev 1197, 1199 (1999). Professor Williams suggests that corporate disclosure 
could be used to enforce corporate social responsibility. See id at 1310–11. Among other things, there-
fore, she suggests an explicit disclosure of corporate expenditures on political activity. See id. 
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pounded into the market price of its stock.27 In other words, disclosure is all 
that is required to ensure that the size of the corporation’s treasury available 
for political activity lines up with its investors’ support for that activity. 28  
The point is not that the corporation’s financial strength will match the 
numerical strength of its views within the general population, in an egalitar-
ian-distribution-of-resources sense. But the same is true for any person, or 
unincorporated association of persons, of means. Egalitarianism is not a 
good reason for curtailing corporate political speech but not the political 
speech of wealthy individuals or other unincorporated business entities. In-
deed, discriminating against corporate political speech might be anti-
egalitarian, because it would take away from individuals the ability to or-
ganize in a form that would allow them to engage efficiently in collective 
action. 29  
At any rate, egalitarianism is not the policy that the Supreme Court in-
voked when it referred to “corrosive” corporate wealth. The Court’s justif i-
cation for singling out corporations was that managers could amass huge 
treasuries as a result of corporate economic activ ities and state-conferred 
advantages, treasuries that had little to do with the political support for the 
positions that managers might cause the corporation to take, and so manag-
ers could distort the nation’s political discourse.30 But, to repeat, assuming 
                                                                                                                 
27 See Louis Lowenstein, Financial Transparency and Corporate Governance: You Manage What 
You Measure, 96 Colum L Rev 1335, 1361 (1996) (concluding that the integrity of U.S. capital markets 
ensures that stock prices reflect managerial performance).  
28 Disclosure and the ensuing disciplining force of the market dominate governance mechanisms 
such as the submission of specific expenditures to a shareholder vote. Compare Ian Ramsay, Geof St a-
pledon, and Joel Vernan, Political Donations by Australian Companies 4–5, 31–32, working paper 
(2001), available online at <http://papers.ssrn.com/id=286112> (visited Feb 15, 2002) (suggesting that 
corporations should disclose prior to contribution so investors may make informed decisions as to vot-
ing and investing); Victor Brudney and Allen Ferrell, Corporate Charitable Giving, 69 U Chi L Rev 
1191, 1210, 1212 n 52 (2002). This is because at this level of specificity shareholder views are not sin-
gle-peaked and thus invite the well-known voting pathologies of agenda manipulation and cycling. See 
Frank H. Easterbrook and Daniel R. Fischel, Voting in Corporate Law, 26 J L & Econ 395, 405–06 
(1983); Roberta Romano, Answering the Wrong Question: The Tenuous Case for Mandatory Corporate 
Laws, 89 Colum L Rev 1599, 1611–12 (1989). 
29 See Roberta Romano, Metapolitics and Corporate Law Reform , 36 Stan L Rev 923, 992–93 
(1984) (“[P]luralism’s organizational dimension [ ] sees a need for individuals to organize into groups” 
as a means of engaging in collective action, including individuals who have “ordered their affairs in 
business firms.”). See also Butler and Ribstein, The Corporation and the Constitution at 66 n 49 (cited 
in note 8) (“Shareholders could, of course, form their own interest groups to oppose those of managers. 
But the shareholders’ groups, unlike ‘corporate’ PACs, would have to bear their own organization costs. 
These costs, together with the free-rider problem inherent in collective action, would inhibit such ef-
forts.”). 
30 See Austin , 494 US at 659 (internal quotation marks omitted), quoting Massachusetts Citizens 
for Life, 479 US at 258: 
Resources in the treasury of a business corporation . . . are not an indication of popular support for 
the corporation’s political ideas. They reflect instead the economically motivated decisions of in-
vestors and customers. The availability of these resources may make a corporation a formidable 
political presence, even though the power of the corporation may be no reflection of the power of 
its ideas.  
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disclosure, the only way managers of a large, publicly traded corporation 
could amass a huge treasury for political activities is if investors favored 
those activ ities. Publicly traded corporations—unlike individuals such as 
Ross Perot (who spent $63.5 million of his own money in his unsuccessful 
1992 presidential campaign), Steve Forbes (who spent $38.7 million of his 
own money in his unsuccessful 2000 presidential campaign), Jon Corzine 
(who spent $63 million of his own money for one of New Jersey’s two seats 
in the U.S. Senate), and Michael Bloomberg (who spent $68.9 million of 
his own money in 2001 to become Mayor of New York),31 and unlike other 
unincorporated entities—are subject to the disciplining force of capital mar-
kets.  
This is true even if the corporation holds a monopoly in its product 
market, perhaps because it holds all of the relevant patents. Corporations, 
after all, are artificial persons that are no more than a nexus or web of ex-
press, implied, and metaphorical contracts.32 Shareholders are the marginal 
or residual claimants in this arrangement, so every additional dollar spent 
on political activities is a dollar less for the shareholders. If they tolerate 
such an arrangement, it must be because they are willing to tolerate the po-
litical activities of the corporation.  
Against this it might be argued that market checks are effective only 
against large corporations, which means that smaller firms would still be 
free to distort the political marketplace. But private contractual solutions 
and shareholder monitoring are easier in smaller corporations.33 What is 
more, smaller firms by definition do not have the resources to “distort.” The 
more “immense” a corporation’s “aggregation of wealth,” and so the greater 
the potential for “corrosion,” the stronger the market-based checks on its 
managers’ behavior.  
2. Corporate rent seeking. 
The second variation on the bad politics rationale for section 441b is 
that it represents an appropriate response to corporate rent seeking via lob-
bying for redistributive legislation. There is much to be said for this second 
variation on the bad politics worry, because it does not require an assump-
tion that investors are irrational. 34 Rational investors might happily tolerate 
                                                                                                                 
31 See Michael Cooper, At $92.60 a Vote, Bloomberg Shatters an Election Record , NY Times A1, 
A20 (Dec 4, 2001); Tom Hamburger, Who Wants a Multimillionaire?: Democrats, to Help Win Senate, 
Wall St J A28 (Oct 19, 2000). 
32 See, for example, Frank H. Easterbrook and Daniel R. Fischel, The Corporate Contract, 89 
Colum L Rev 1416, 1425–26 (1989); Jensen and Meckling, 3 J Fin Econ at 310–11 (cited in note 9); 
Armen A. Alchian and Harold Demsetz, Production, Information Costs, and Economic Organization, 62 
Am Econ Rev 777, 787–789 (1972). 
33 Compare Frank H. Easterbrook and Daniel R. Fischel, Close Corporations and Agency Costs, 
38 Stan L Rev 271, 280–83 (1986); Ian Ayres, Judging Close Co rporations in the Age of Statutes, 70 
Wash U L Q 365, 378–83 (1992).  
34 As a class, however, shareholders might prefer no lobbying at all. See text accompanying notes 
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managers’ making campaign contributions and expenditures when the mar-
ginal return on those payments—the rents, that is, which come from the 
private interest governmental action that the spending purchases—exceeds 
the marginal return on directing that money to any other use.35 Thus, rather 
than reckless corporate political spending, efficient markets should prompt 
what is, from the corporation’s perspective, efficient rent seeking. Of 
course, from the perspective of society this is undesirable, because obtain-
ing rents through redistributive regulation merely reallocates rather than in-
creases social wealth. Worse, it comes at the cost of deadweight lobbying 
expenses and possibly the forgoing of other social-wealth-maximizing op-
portunities.36 So this rationale for limiting corporate campaign expenditures 
has some purchase. Importantly, however, this rationale does not require a 
misalignment of interests between shareholders and managers. Instead, its 
basis is a public choice view of the agency relationship between society and 
lawmakers. 
There is, moreover, a plausible argument that the corporate form fur-
nishes a competitive advantage in the market for legislation. If correct, this 
would justify singling out corporations for special treatment. The argument 
runs as follows: The chief impediments to effective lobbying are the collec-
tive action and free rider problems that stem from the fact that regulation is 
something of a public good. 37 But the corporate form provides a simple way 
to channel rents to only those who have paid their dues, as it were. If you do 
not own stock, you do not benefit from the larger dividends or appreciation 
in the stock price caused by the passage of private interest legislation.38 And 
for an already existing corporation, the fixed costs of organizing into the 
corporate form are sunk.39 Thus, if the corporate form does in fact provide a 
comparative advantage in the market for legislation, we should expect the 
deadweight losses associated with corporate rent seeking to be particularly 
large, which in turn justifies targeting corporation-specific rent seeking in 
particular. Put into the parlance of doctrinal analysis, this amounts to an ar-
gument that the state’s interest in preventing corporations from seeking 
                                                                                                                 
55 and 86. 
35 Compare Ribstein, 49 Wash & Lee L Rev at 148 (cited in note 8) (stating that for-profit firms 
will invest in nonpolitical activity if the “return from doing so exceeds that from investing in political 
activities”).  
36 See, for example, McChesney, Money for Nothing at 9–17 (cited in note 13) (outlining the tra-
ditional economic theory of regulation and discussing the social costs of rent seeking under it). 
37 For a general discussion, see Buchanan and Tullock, The Calculus of Consent (cited in note 
12); Olson, The Logic of Collective Action (cited in note 12).  
38 See Meese, 2 Wm & Mary Bill Rts J at 318–20 (cited in note 8) (discussing factors that will 
hamper collective action). See also Romano, 36 Stan L Rev at 992–93 (cited in note 29).  
39 Robert E. McCormick and Robert D. Tollison, Politicians, Legislation, and the Economy: An 
Inquiry into the Interest-Group Theory of Government 17 (Martinus Nijhoff 1981) (noting the compara-
tive advantage of groups that have already organized); William N. Eskridge, Jr., Philip P. Frickey, and 
Elizabeth Garrett, Cases and Materials on Legislation: Statutes and the Creation of Public Policy 52 
(West 3d ed 2001) (same). 
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rents via lobbying for redistributive legislation is significantly stronger than 
its interest in preventing the seeking of similar rents by others, because the 
seeking of such rents through the corporate form is far more destructive. We 
shall return to this point later.40 
B. Harming Shareholders 
The second style of argument in favor of discriminating against corpo-
rate political speech is that doing so is necessary to protect shareholders 
from managerial opportunism—that is, these rules help police the agency 
problem between managers and shareholders. This Part contends that there 
is nothing special about the agency problem inherent in managers’ control 
over corporate political speech that distinguishes it from any other area of 
managerial discretion so as to warrant a specialized mandatory rule and 
criminalization.  
1. Election codes and the “internal affairs doctrine.” 
An initial and immediate objection to all the variations on the share-
holder/manager agency costs rationale for discriminating against corporate 
political speech is that all state law corporation-specific campaign finance 
limitations are found in the election laws of the states, not in their corporate 
codes.41 This creates an odd asymmetry whereby the shareholders of all 
corporations, wherever they might be incorporated, are “protected” against 
managers making corporate donations within a state that has enacted one of 
these statutes, but shareholders of firms incorporated in such a state are not 
necessarily protected against managers’ political spending outside that state. 
Had these rules been included in the states’ corporate codes, however, then 
by operation of the choice of law rule known as the “internal affairs doc-
trine”42 the statutes would bar political spending by managers everywhere, 
not just within jurisdictions that had included such a ban in their election 
codes. The failure to include these provisions in state corporate codes there-
fore strongly suggests that they were not motivated by a worry about the ef-
ficacy of more traditional means of corporate governance to police this di-
mension of the agency between shareholders and managers.43 The presence 
                                                                                                                 
40 See Part II.A. 
41 It is also worth noting that the relevant portion of the Model Business Corporation Act ex-
pressly permits spending for political purposes. See MBCA § 3.02(15) official comment (1994) (“This 
clause, which is in addition to and independent of the power to make charitable and sim ilar donations 
under section 3.02(13), permits contributions for purposes that may not be charitable, such as for polit i-
cal purposes or to influence elections.”).  
42 See, for example, Hollis v Hill, 232 F3d 460, 464–65 (5th Cir 2000) (“[T]he internal affairs of 
the foreign corporation . . . are governed by the laws of the jurisdiction of incorporation.”); Nagy v Rib-
let Products Corp , 79 F3d 572, 576 (7th Cir 1996) (Easterbrook) (same). 
43 Ribstein, 49 Wash & Lee L Rev at 143 (cited in note 8) (“The fact that the government has 
acted through election statutes rather than through corporation statutes indicates that the statutes are in-
tended as direct speech restrictions rather than as shareholder protection that only indirectly impacts 
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of these provisions in state election rather than state corporate codes is, 
however, explainable by the political economy analysis offered later in this 
Article.44  
2. Misappropriation. 
The first commonly advanced shareholder protection rationale for sec-
tion 441b is that it is essential to protect all shareholders from the theft—
effectively the looting—of their assets. President Theodore Roosevelt, for 
example, urged in a 1905 message to Congress that “directors should not be 
permitted to use stockholders’ money” for political purposes, and Members 
of Congress used words like “embezzle” to characterize such activity. 45 An 
initial response is simply to rehash many of the arguments previously 
urged, that the various markets within which managers operate—capital, 
product, and corporate control—will sufficiently align managers’ interests 
with that of shareholders to ensure that managers will not spend money on 
speech contrary to the wishes of shareholders.46  
Still, one could argue with some force that the various markets within 
which managers operate provide enough slack for them to get away with 
some political spending, a gap not closed by governance mechanisms be-
cause of their costs. In other words, we live in a world with agency costs. 
This argument, however, applies with equal force to any seemingly non-
profit-maximizing activity undertaken by managers within this space. So it 
fails to explain why this particular form of managerial discretion—that is, 
why this particular dimension of the shareholder/manager agency prob-
lem—requires not only special legislation but also a mandatory rule and 
criminalization. The critical question, in other words, is whether there is 
any reason to suppose that the usual corporate governance checks on the 
shareholder/manager agency problem will be unusually ineffective in this 
context. There are four related points to be made here.  
                                                                                                                 
speech.”); Meese, 2 Wm & Mary Bill Rts J at 315 n 83 (cited in note 8); Lowenstein, 21 Cap U L Rev at 
408 (cited in note 8); Butler and Ribstein, The Corporation and the Constitution at 67 (cited in note 8). 
44 See Part II.B.  
45 President’s Annual Message, 59th Cong, 1st Sess, in 40 Cong Rec S 96 (Dec 5, 1905); Bolton, 
22 Ariz L Rev at 376–79 (cited in note 8) (recounting the congressional debate about and President 
Theodore Roosevelt’s concern over protecting shareholders from managers’ spending corporate funds 
for political purposes). For example, Congressman Williams said: 
[N]o board of directors of a corporation and no manager . . . has the right, to embezzle the money 
belonging to the stockholders of the corporation and to divert it from its legitimate use to a purpose 
for which the company was not chartered by appropriating it to Democratic, Republican, Populist, 
Socialist, or any other campaign fund. 
Hearings on Contributions to Political Committees in Presidential and Other Campaigns before the 
House Committee on the Election of the President, Vice-President, and Representatives in Congress, 
59th Cong, 1st Sess 76 (1906). 
46 See Meese, 2 Wm & Mary Bill Rts J at 309 (cited in note 8); Ribstein, 49 Wash & Lee L Rev at 
138–40 (cited in note 8). See also Butler and Ribstein, The Corporation and the Constitution at 59–78 
(cited in note 8). 
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First, the market must be aware of this slack, so stock prices should be 
discounted accordingly. Related, in the absence of a mandatory proscrip-
tion, investors could have sought a private contractual solution such as a 
“no politics” charter provision. This is not a fanciful notion. A number of 
large corporations—including General Motors, Ford Motors, Monsanto, 
Time Warner, Dell, Cisco, and IBM—have announced a policy against giv-
ing soft-money donations, and this group is growing. 47 Given that soft-
money donations were unregulated at the time of these announcements, this 
suggests that private contractual solutions are indeed viable.  
Second, a mandatory proscription is serious business. No matter how 
sophisticated the shareholders and how much they might want to permit po-
litical spending by managers, the rule of section 441b and its state ana-
logues is mandatory. A less drastic alternative would have been to ban cor-
porate political donations in the absence of a specific charter provision au-
thorizing them. 48 Something of a penalty default,49 such a rule would have 
ensured clear notice of the potential for polit ical spending without disabling 
such spending in all cases. Similarly, charter provisions could have been 
used to ensure the specific disclosure of political spending, thereby facilitat-
ing the impounding of that information into the stock price.50 
Third, there are good reasons why rational shareholders might want to 
allow managers the freedom to make political donations. Hence a manda-
tory proscription possibly diminishes the aggregate welfare of shareholders 
as a class.51 For example, in view of the possibility that the corporation will 
be the victim, as it were, of redistributive legislation sought by others, from 
                                                                                                                 
47 See Don Van Natta, Jr., As Political Gifts Set a Record Pace, Some Quit Giving, NY Times A1 
(May 2, 2000) (citing General Motors, Monsanto, and Tim e Warner as having policies against giving 
soft -money donations); Paula Dwyer and Nicole St. Pierre, Who’s Giving All That Soft Money, Bus Wk 
171 (Nov 13, 2000) (citing IBM, Cisco, and Dell as having policies against giving soft-money dona-
tions); Deroy Murdock, Reform -Minded CEOs Pledge to Shake Free of Political Shakedowns, Wash 
Times 46 (Mar 20, 2000) (citing Allied Signal and Ameritech as having stopped giving soft-money do-
nations). See also notes 207–11 and accompanying text; Edmund Sanders, Many Businesses Root for 
Reform to Limit Political Contributions, LA Times C1 (Apr 18, 2001).  
48 A suggestion offered in Fisch, 32 Wm & Mary L Rev at 641–42 (cited in note 8) (“[Another] 
way to handle corporate political speech is through the charter as a corporate contract.”). See also Butler 
and Ribstein, The Corporation and the Constitution  at 64–65 (cited in note 8) (arguing that “parties to 
the corporation can invest in corporate governance devices that minimize divergence of interest” and 
that “contracts restricting managers’ speech do not raise significant First Amendment concerns”). 
49 See Ian Ayres and Robert Gertner, Filling Gaps in Incomplete Contracts: An Economic Theory 
of Default Rules, 99 Yale L J 87, 91 (1989) (defining a “penalty default” as a rule “purposefully set at 
what the parties would not want” so as to “give at least one party . . . an incentive to contract around the 
[penalty] default rule”).  
50 See notes 26–28 and accompanying text. 
51 Compare Ribstein, 49 Wash & Lee L Rev at 142–43 (cited in note 8): 
A campaign finance limit in a state corporation statute might be defended on contractual grounds 
as to shareholders who invest in corporations bound by the provision. . . . [But] the mandatory na-
ture of the law would be unjustified if the laws imposed costs in excess of benefits in many of the 
situations in which they applied. 
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the shareholders’ perspective it may be more efficient (owing to collective 
action and free rider problems) to have the corporation’s managers engage 
in political activities than to do so themselves. Managers are more likely 
than shareholders to be aware of what legislation will benefit or harm the 
corporation. Thus, for all the same reasons that shareholders delegate deci-
sionmaking authority regarding ordinary business judgments to managers, 
they might also want to delegate authority to make political interventions. 
“Casual empiricism” lends support to the view that corporate political in-
terventions are indeed “vehicles for profit maximization.”52 An irony here is 
that the current mandatory proscription channels corporate political speech 
into other less direct forms—such as corporate PACs—that are not subject 
to the usual corporate governance checks that would have applied to the 
(now prohibited) direct use of corporate funds.53  
Another possibility is that investors might believe that the corporate 
form facilitates the seeking of legislative rents. To them, spending on poli-
tics is sometimes a more profitable alternative to spending on, say, research 
and development. They want the corporation to invest in whichever has the 
higher marginal rate of return. On this view, as with corporate charitable 
giving—which no one seems eager to proscribe despite the existence of the 
very same agency problem—there may well be a corporate profit-
maximizing and therefore pro-shareholder rationale for corporate political 
speech.54 To be fair, however, it should be noted that well-diversified share-
holders might not appreciate this approach to profit maximization. Well-
diversified investors are equally as likely to be on the losing side as the 
winning side of a redistributive battle between incorporated firms, so on av-
erage they would be worse off because the transfer costs represent a dead-
weight loss.55 Thus, from the shareholder perspective, the issue becomes an 
empirical question of whether the aggregate wealth transfers from unincor-
porated firms and society at large obtained by the rent seeking efforts of 
management exceed the deadweight loss of the transaction costs of wealth 
                                                                                                                 
52 See Romano, 36 Stan L Rev at 995 (cited in note 29) (“Casual empiricism supports the conten-
tion that corporate PACs and political expenditures are in fact vehicles for profit maximization.”). Com-
pare Anup Agrawal and Charles R. Knoeber, Do Some Outside Directors Play a Political Role?, 44 J L 
& Econ 179, 180, 197 (2001) (suggesting that empirical data support the conclusion that where politics 
plays an important role in profit maximization, some outside directors play a political role). 
53 See Butler and Ribstein, The Corporation and the Constitution at 66 (cited in note 8).  
54 For a general discussion on corporate charitable giving, see Brudney and Ferrell, 69 U Chi L 
Rev 1191 (cited in note 28); Richard W. Painter, Commentary on Brudney and Ferrell, 69 U Chi L Rev 
1219 (2002); Henry N. Butler and Fred S. McChesney, Why They Give at the Office: Shareholder We l-
fare and Corporate Philanthropy in the Contractual Th eory of the Corporation , 84 Cornell L Rev 1195 
(1999); Henry G. Manne, The Limits and Rationale of Corporate Altruism: An Individualistic Model, 59 
Va L Rev 708 (1973); David S. Ruder, Public Obligations of Private Corporations, 114 U Pa L Rev 209 
(1965). 
55 Butler and Ribstein, The Corporation and the Constitution at 64 (cited in note 8) (“Managers 
may want to advocate wealth transfers to their own firms from others, while shareholders would regard 
such transfers as shifting wealth within their portfolios while imposing dead-weight transfer costs.”).  
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transfers between incorporated firms. At any rate, unincorporated entities 
seek legislative rents too, so well-diversified shareholders might rationally 
opt to delegate responsibility for opposing the rent seeking of others to 
management.  
Fourth, there is some irony in the contrast between the law’s treatment 
of charitable and political donations. Although the common law imposed 
some limits on managerial freedom to make charitable donations, requiring 
that they be reasonable and have some connection to a corporate benefit,56 a 
number of states have by statute freed managers from even that require-
ment.57 These states have therefore aggravated the very same agency prob-
lem, albeit in a different context, that has been suggested to be a justifica-
tion for section 441b and its state law analogues. Of course, unlike most 
(but surely not all58) charitable spending, corporate efforts to obtain redis-
tributive legislation or regulation, although possibly profit-maximizing, are 
nevertheless social welfare-reducing. Thus, if as suggested above the corpo-
rate form affords competitive advantages in the market for legislation, then 
that might be a reason to limit corporate political activity. But the basis for 
that ban would be to protect society from the purchase of special-interest 
regulation by corporations and their shareholders, not to protect sharehold-
ers. The basis for that ban, in other words, would be the society/lawmaker 
agency problem, not a divergence of interests between shareholders and 
managers. 
                                                                                                                 
56 A.P. Smith Manufacturing Co v Barlow, 13 NJ 145, 98 A2d 581, 590 (1953); James D. Cox, 
Thomas Lee Hazen, and F. Hodge O’Neal, 1 Corporations § 4.4 at 4.8–4.12 (Aspen 2002).  
57 See, for example, Cal Corp Code § 207(e) (West 1990) (allowing managers to “[m]ake dona-
tions, regardless of specific corporate benefit, for the public welfare or for community fund, hospital, 
charitable, educational, scientific, civic or similar purposes”); NY Bus Corp Law § 202(a)(12) (McKin-
ney 1986) (permitting New York corporations to “make donations, irrespective of corporate benefit, for 
the public welfare or for community fund, hospital, charitable, educational, scientific, civic or similar 
purposes, and in time of war or other national emergency in aid thereof”). See generally R. Franklin Ba-
lotti and James J. Franks, Giving at the Office: A Reappraisal of Charitable Contributions by Corpora-
tions, 54 Bus Law 965, 970–78 (1999) (discussing state statutes). 
58 For interesting examples of recent charitable giving with a rent-seeking (and possibly extor-
tionate) overtone, see Frank Bruni, Donors Flock to University Center Linked to Senate Majority 
Leader, NY Times A1 (May 18, 1999) (“An academic center under construction at the University of 
Mississippi and named for Senator Trent Lott, the majority leader, is being endowed with million-dollar 
donations from companies with huge stakes in pending Congressional legislation.”). See also Jason 
Zengerle, Wingate Dispatch: At Home Abroad, New Republic 18 (June 4, 2001): 
Helms himself has no official involvement with the [Jesse Helms Center, loosely affiliated with 
Wingate University], but his wife and daughter serve on its board, and the center’s president used 
to raise money for Helms’s political campaigns. So it’s no surprise that people seeking to show 
their appreciation of—or to curry favor with—Helms have been extremely generous to the center 
that bears his name. Various tobacco companies have contributed more than $1 million; the textile 
magnate and ardent protectionist Roger Milliken has given $250,000; Jack Valenti has chipped in 
over $10,000. 
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3. The minority shareholder. 
The second commonly offered shareholder protection rationale is the 
need to protect dissident shareholders—those who disagree with the views 
“expressed by management on behalf of the corporation.”59 This rationale 
differs from the more traditional form of the agency problem identified 
above in that it supposes authorization of the corporate speech by a majority 
of the shareholders. The focus here is on protecting the rights of the minor-
ity, who some think are compelled to fund speech with which they disagree 
in violation of their First Amendment right not to speak.60 That right’s ap-
plication here assumes that shareholders are locked into their investment, 
and further that in the absence of regulation all corporations will engage in 
political speech.61 But these assumptions depend on a paucity of investment 
opportunities and/or opaque securities markets. These assumptions are du-
bious, and not only because this risk is known and therefore assumed, 
which means that the stock should be priced accordingly.  
Take the assumption that in the absence of a statutory prohib ition no 
firm would swear off political activity. If there are resources held by pro-
spective investors who are skittish about funding political speech (perhaps 
because they are a church or a university) but otherwise would be happy to 
invest in stock, then some firms would simply insert “no politics” clauses 
into their corporate charters, or mutual fund companies would create a “no 
politics” fund, to tap into this source of capital. 62 Consider the proliferation 
of “social responsibility” funds. These funds assure investors that their 
money will not be invested in corporations engaged in certain specific 
forms of behavior, such as the sale of alcohol or tobacco, military contract-
ing, abortion-related services, and so on.63 There is a fund for everyone: just 
as the Meyers Pride Value Fund avoids companies that lack stated policies 
against discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation, the Timothy Plan 
funds avoid companies that provide domestic partner benefits.64 What is 
more, as noted earlier, a number of high-profile publicly traded corpora-
                                                                                                                 
59 First National Bank of Boston v Bellotti, 435 US 765, 787 (1977).  
60 See Abood v Detroit Board of Education , 431 US 209, 234–35 (1977); West Virginia State 
Board of Education v Barnette, 319 US 624, 634–35 (1943). Compare Board of Regents of the Univer-
sity of Wisconsin System v Southworth , 529 US 217, 229–31 (2000). 
61 For the first assumption, see Austin v Michigan Chamber of Commerce, 494 US 663 (1990); 
FEC v Massachusetts Citizens for Life, Inc, 479 US 238, 260 (1986). For the second, see Brudney, 91 
Yale L J at 235–37 (cited in note 8). See also notes 75–79 and accompanying text. 
62 A point made in Grossberg, Comment, 42 U Chi L Rev at 157 (cited in note 8). 
63 See Danny Hakim, On Wall St., More Investors Push Social Goals, NY Times A1 (Feb 11, 
2001); Susan Sherriek, A Conscience Doesn’t Have to Make You Poor, Bus Wk 204 (May 1, 2000). The 
relevance of the development of these funds has been misunderstood. For example, Joo, 79 Wash U L Q 
at 61 & n 364 (cited in note 8), cites these funds as evidence that some investors have nonpecuniary 
goals, yet ignores the probability that this would motivate some managers to eschew political speech in 
order to tap into that source of capital. See id at 70–75.  
64 Hakim, More Investors, NY Times at A1 (cited in note 63).  
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tions have pledged to forbear from soft-money donations.65 Since corporate 
soft-money donations were legal at the time of these pledges, the behavior 
of these corporations belies the assumption that without legal constraints all 
corporations would make political donations. 
Alternatively, take the distinction between incorporated nonprofit po-
litical associations and for-profit business corporations that the Austin  Court 
seized upon to justify exempting the former from section 441b.66 According 
to the Court, shareholders or members of incorporated nonprofit political 
associations can easily dissociate themselves from the organization should 
they disagree with its political activity. In contrast, because shareholders of 
business corporations are “dependent” on the enterprise for income, there is 
an “economic disincentive” to dissociating. 67 But this analysis is backwards, 
for it is the nonprofit political corporation’s minority members who have a 
powerful disincentive to dissociate. A profit-seeking investor’s “economic 
disincentive” to dissociating is nonsense. The minority shareholder who in-
vests in stock for income, which is the precondition to having an economic 
disincentive to dissociating, is by hypothesis indifferent between companies 
with comparable rates of return. He therefore has no reason not to sell his 
stock in the politically active company and then invest the proceeds in an-
other company that is not politically active.68 In contrast, the minority 
shareholder or member of the incorporated nonprofit political association 
often faces an incentive not to dissociate because of the shortage of alterna-
tives. There is a thick market for corporate securities; the menu of prospec-
tive political associations is less robust.69 
4. One-share/one-vote. 
A third variation on the shareholder protection argument grows out of 
the observation that “[v]oting in large publicly held corporations is by the 
share, not by the person.”70 Thus, to borrow the words of Professor Victor 
Brudney, “the political power of individuals with large blocks of stock is 
magnified to the extent they can control, for political purposes, the use of 
the assets of minority shareholders that are held in corporate solution.”71 As 
a potential justification for section 441b, this is perhaps best thought of as a 
                                                                                                                 
65 See note 47 and accompanying text. 
66 494 US at 662–65 (distinguishing the Michigan Chamber of Commerce from an incorporated 
nonprofit political association). See also Beaumont v FEC, 278 F3d 261, 273–74 (4th Cir 2002); FEC v 
National Rifle Association of America , 254 F3d 173, 188–92 (DC Cir 2001) (comparing the National Ri-
fle Association to an incorporated nonprofit political association). 
67 Massachusetts Citizens for Life, 479 US at 264. 
68 See Ribstein, 49 Wash & Lee L Rev at 137 (cited in note 8).  
69 Butler and Ribstein, The Corporation and the Constitution  at 74–75 (cited in note 8) (discuss-
ing the difficulties a member of an ideological group faces in exiting, as opposed to the shareholders in 
an corporation). 
70  Brudney, 91 Yale L J at 258 (cited in note 8). 
71 Id at 258 & n 83. 
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subtle expansion of the minority shareholder protection rationale just dis-
cussed. The traditional understanding of the “minority” requiring protection 
is that it comprises those stockholders who disagree with the corporation’s 
speech but who collectively own too few shares to prevail in a proxy fight. 
Because the usual rules of corporate elections call for voting in proportion 
to the number of shares that one owns, this “minority” might well represent 
a numerical majority (of owners, not shares) that, but for the one-share/one-
vote rule, would control. This argument thus taps into the intuition that so 
far as politics are concerned, one-person/one-vote is the only fair allocation 
of decisionmaking authority. 
But the objection to corporate political speech based on the traditional 
rule of one-share/one-vote misconceives the economic realities of corporate 
governance. As Frank Easterbrook and Daniel Fischel have shown, in a sys-
tem with voting rights that are not proportional to the voter’s stake in the 
enterprise, there will be a reduced incentive for voters to make optimal de-
cisions, because the gains or losses stemming from these decisions will not 
be internalized at a level corresponding to the influence of one’s vote. 
Therefore any rule other than one-share/one-vote wastefully increases the 
agency costs associated with the corporate form.72  
To be sure, this means that a single person, by virtue of a 51 percent 
ownership stake in a corporation, will be able to control 100 percent of the 
corporation’s resources. And that, in turn, makes possible a scenario in 
which this single person’s voice will be made louder at the expense of the 
perhaps thousands of minority shareholders.73 But this hypothetical reveals 
this objection for what it really is: either a mere restatement of the notion 
that minority shareholders (who here happen to constitute a numerical ma-
jority) need protection; an argument that the majority stakeholder will mis-
appropriate the minority’s funds; or an argument for doing something about 
the effects of an inegalitarian distribution of wealth.  
As with the more straightforward protection of minority shareholders 
argument explored above, only an irrational investor—or a rational investor 
who supported the majority shareholder’s views—would leave his money 
in such an arrangement without requiring a discount to reflect this risk. Put-
ting this particular spin on why minority shareholders require protection 
does nothing to advance the substance of the argument. Similarly, the 
analysis above regarding the simple agency problem of managers’ potential 
misappropriation also adequately replies to this more exotic misappropria-
tion fear. Granted, minority shareholders cannot “fire” a majority holder. 
But that problem is solved by (and perhaps helps explain) the fiduciary du-
ties that state corporate law imposes on dominant shareholders. In these 
cases dominant shareholders are held to all the same fiduciary standards 
                                                                                                                 
72 Easterbrook and Fischel, Voting in Corporate Law, 26 J L & Econ at 405–09 (cited in note 28). 
73 See Brudney, 91 Yale L J at 258 (cited in note 8). 
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that ordinarily apply to management.74 Finally, if this argument is merely a 
masked complaint about the distribution of wealth in society, then the prob-
lem is not with the corporate form as much as it is with the allocation of re-
sources in a capitalist economy. And that does not justify singling out in-
corporated firms while leaving individuals and other business associations 
untouched. 
5. Lowering the cost of capital. 
The final twist on this line of argument is that section 441b lowers the 
cost of capital.75 The argument takes the form of a syllogism beginning with 
the premise that “most companies would ‘bundle’ the power to make politi-
cal and economic decisions.”76 So in the absence of a proscription on con-
tributions or at least a requirement of stockholder consent, individuals look-
ing to invest their money would have no choice but to “relinquish full con-
trol of their resources for making political speech.”77 As a result, some peo-
ple might be deterred from investing. This bundling of decisionmaking 
power would therefore be “inefficient by conventional economic analysis” 
if the premium investors seek as compensation for their loss of political 
control outweighed the savings from avoiding the added transaction costs of 
a corporation’s having to raise money for its business and political enter-
prises independently. 78 
The problem with this syllogism is its premise. Although managers as 
a class might hold a monopoly position in a loose sense, there is enormous 
competit ion within that class. This argument assumes, in effect, that man-
agers, if not a cartel, will behave like one, the final result of their conscious 
parallelism being that all managers will offer only stock that bundles bus i-
ness with politics. But there are far too many managers competing with 
each other in both the market for corporate control and the capital market 
(in which, of course, managers compete not only with each other but with 
nonstock alternatives as well) for this to make any sense.79 If there are in-
                                                                                                                 
74 See, for example, Sinclair Oil Corp v Levien , 280 A2d 717 (Del 1971); Zahn v Transamerica 
Corp , 162 F2d 36 (3d Cir 1947); American Law Institute, Principles of Corporate Governance: Analysis 
and Recommendations § 5.11 at 334 (1994); Cox, Hazen, and O’Neal, Corporations § 11.10 at 11.53 
(cited in note 56) (“The basis for the controlling stockholder’s fiduciary obligation is the sound policy 
that, just as directors are bound by certain fiduciary obligations, one who has the potential to control the 
board’s actions should be subject to an obligation as rigorous as those applied to the directors.”). 
75 See Brudney, 91 Yale L J at 264–65 (cited in note 8) (“Allowing capital to be raised on the 
condition that its contributors permit management to use it for political purposes, without providing 
them a meaningful choice as to the particular political or noncommercial use, may increase the cost of 
capital.”). 
76 Id at 270 (citation omitted). 
77 Id.  
78 Id at 264–65. See also Austin v Michigan Chamber of Commerce, 494 US 663, 675–78 & n 8 
(Brennan concurring). 
79 See Meese, 2 Wm & Mary Bill Rts J at 309, 338 (cited in note 8) (arguing that “[n]o firm pos-
sesses economic power in capital markets sufficient to ‘coerce’ prospective shareholders into accepting 
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vestors who are willing to make their capital available at lower cost to man-
agers who promise to forbear from political activity, then some managers 
would make that promise in order to tap into that cheaper capital. After all, 
as noted earlier, a number of high-profile corporations have announced a 
flat policy against the giving of then-legal soft-money donations, and in-
vestment funds often cater to the idiosyncratic policy preferences of inves-
tors. 
*   *   *   *   * 
At bottom, most of the conventional justifications for section 441b and 
its state analogues suppose investor irrationality and thus are vulnerable on 
that ground. What is left, then, are the arguments that it is inherently unfair 
that people with more money can spend more on political speech and that 
the corporate form provides competitive advantages in the market for legis-
lation. Of these, the first is a normative judgment for which the foregoing 
analysis can do little except expose it as such. The second argument, how-
ever, is something to which further analysis can speak.  
II.   THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF REGULATING CORPORATE POLITICAL 
SPEECH  
This Part explores the political economy of the longstanding discrimi-
nation against corporate political speech. Part II.A revisits the question of 
rent seeking by corporations and explores its relationship to the regulation 
of corporate political speech. Drawing on the traditional economic theory of 
regulation and the relevant collective action dynamics, Part II.B offers a 
partial explanation for why corporations might favor discrimination against 
corporate political speech consistent with the fact that the state-level regula-
tion of corporate political speech is located in state election rather than state 
corporate codes. Part II.C briefly outlines the “new” economic theory of 
regulation, most closely associated with Fred McChesney, and its relation-
ship to the traditional approach, often associated with George Stigler.80 Fi-
nally, informed by the McChesney economic model of regulation, Part II.D 
explores the underlying political economy of the 1907 Tillman Act in light 
of a fresh look at the historical record. 
A. Corporate Rent Seeking 
The analysis above suggested that the corporate form might provide an 
especially effective vehicle for overcoming the collective action and free 
rider problems that are the principal barriers to success in the market for 
legislation. 81 The idea was that incorporation captures in the form of stock 
                                                                                                                 
an unwanted bundling arrangement[,]” and that “[a]bsent a massive conspiracy among major corpora-
tions, no firm has economic power over potential shareholders”) (citation omitted). 
80 See also Omri Yadlin, Commentary on Sitkoff, 69 U Chi L Rev 1167 (2002). 
81 See Part I.A.2. 
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the group’s (shareholders’) stake in the leaders’ (managers’) lobbying ef-
forts. Moreover, in contrast to the costs of organizing a new group, for an 
already existing corporation the fixed costs of organization are sunk. 82 So 
the argument in favor of the statutes is that they offset these advantages by 
raising the price to corporations of rent seeking by making more cumber-
some the methods through which regulation might be purchased.83 Taxes 
place a drag on direct donations funneled through managers via an in-
creased compensation package, because managers will have to report that 
additional compensation as income. And because a candidate cannot inter-
nalize fully the benefits of a donation to her party (a “soft-money” dona-
tion) as compared to a donation directly to her personal campaign fund, she 
will require a larger donation before supporting legislation favorable to the 
donor. Other indirect means are similarly more costly. Therefore, because 
an increase in price leads to a decrease in consumption (assuming some 
elasticity of demand), perhaps this represents a social welfare justification 
for restricting corporate polit ical donations. On this view the statutes will 
reduce the total amount of socially undesirable corporate lobbying for legis-
lative rents. 
Even if we assume that on balance corporate political activity is so-
cially undesirable, however, it is not clear that these statutes will ameliorate 
that problem. For if in ascertaining price we consider not only the size of 
the donation but also the cost to the corporation of exposure to the risk of 
extortive threats—after all, there is no reason to treat legislators and regula-
tors as merely passive participants in the market for legislation and regula-
tion84—then these statutes might actually reduce the cost of redistributive 
legislation. Just as a candidate cannot fully internalize the benefits of a do-
nation to her party that is prompted by her promise to support legislation 
favorable to the donor, she cannot fully internalize the benefits of a dona-
tion to her party prompted by an extortive ultimatum. Similarly, the cum-
bersome means of funneling a donation through a manager in the form of 
increased compensation and the drag imposed by the tax consequences of 
such an approach would provide an excuse for the inability to respond 
swiftly and fully to an extortive ultimatum. Thus, if the net effect of these 
statutes is to make extortion more difficult, then these laws might encour-
age rather than discourage undesirable participation in the market for legis-
lation. This would be true if the value of the statutes’ extortion-protection 
                                                                                                                 
82 See note 39 and accompanying text. 
83 Direct donations are the most straightforward form of support. See McChesney, Money for 
Nothing at 46–50 (cited in note 13) (“The most obvious form of compensating legislators is to give 
money to them personally or to their campaigns.”). 
84 “We all know that politicians need and actively seek out both votes and campaigncontributions; 
economists can hardly ignore, therefore, the possibility that politicians seek out, or otherwise create, op-
portunities to use the legislative process in fulfillment of those needs.” Douglas Ginsburg, A New Eco-
nomic Theory of Regulation: Rent Extraction Rather than Rent Creation, 97 Mich L Rev 1771, 1773 
(1999), reviewing McChesney, Money for Nothing (cited in note 13). See also Part II.C. 
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function exceeds the increased price for the legislation or regulation that is 
caused by its proscription on direct donations.  
B. Collective Action and the “Internal Affairs Doctrine” 
One pro-corporation view of the statutes—a view both consistent with 
the traditional economic theory of regulation and complementary to the ex-
tortion thesis advanced later in this Part—is that the statutes represent a so-
lution to the collective action problem faced by the managers of a specific 
corporation if the redistributive lobbying by corporations as a class, for the 
most part, victimized other corporations. For if corporate political activity 
represents both offensive and defensive lobbying anent redistributive legis-
lation, then corporations as a class might do better with a flat ban on corpo-
rate campaign contributions. Yet the managers of a single corporation could 
not risk acting unilaterally. 85 From the perspective of well-diversified share-
holders, moreover, wealth transfers between incorporated firms via legisla-
tive action represent nothing more than a deadweight loss in the amount of 
the transfer costs, so shareholders might do better with a total ban (unless 
the aggregate value of transfers from society at large exceeds the transac-
tion costs of the transfers between incorporated firms).86 On this view, the 
statutes solve the collective action problem because they enforce concerted 
action. And indeed the statutes were passed, as we shall see in a moment, in 
the wake of systematic assessments in which political leaders took advan-
tage of just this collective action problem. Consider that solicitation letters 
often noted the pledges of competitors.87 
This collective action dynamic may also explain why on the state level 
corporate political speech is regulated by state election rather than state 
corporate codes. As noted above,88 had the regulations been included in 
state corporate codes, then by operation of the internal affairs doctrine they 
would regulate donations made anywhere by corporations incorporated in 
that state. Instead, because they are located in the election codes, these state 
laws govern the donations of all corporations, regardless of their state of in-
corporation, with regard only to elections in the state that enacted the given 
statute. Hence, the statutes are responsive to the collective action problem 
on both ends—in and out of state. With respect to in-state elections, they 
disarm all corporations regardless of their state of incorporation. But with 
respect to out-of-state elections, corporations incorporated in-state are not 
                                                                                                                 
85 See Butler and Ribstein, The Corporation and the Constitution at 76 (cited in note 8) (“All cor-
porations might come out ahead if none participated in political activity. Yet individual firms cannot af-
ford to refuse to participate in the game, because they may lose more wealth transfers to participating 
firms than they would save in rent-seeking costs.”). 
86 See text accompanying note 55. 
87 See notes 118, 210 and accompanying text. There is evidence that this collective action prob-
lem has purchase in the analogous debate today over whether to ban soft money. See Part IV.A. 
88 See Part I.B.1. 
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unilaterally disarmed, so they are not placed at a disadvantage out-of-state 
when competing for regulation in jurisdictions without a comparable stat-
ute. Although inconsistent with the agency costs shareholder protection ra-
tionale discussed earlier, the placement of these statutory provisions in state 
election rather than state corporate codes is fully consistent with the notion 
that these rules are beneficial to corporations. In light of the collective ac-
tion dynamic identified here, this is a reform that on the state level had to be 
enacted by and applied within one state at a time.89 
C. The “New” Economic Theory of Regulation 
The idea that the statutes solve a collective action problem is premised 
on the notion that corporations as a class do better in a world in which di-
rect donations are prohibited. And indeed that might be true given the 
deadweight transfer costs of simple firm-to-firm wealth transfers. A richer 
account of why corporations as a class might do better with a donation ban, 
however, may be developed by viewing legislators as active participants in 
the market for legislation and conceiving of the statutes as extortion-
protection devices. Building on the traditional economic theory of regula-
tion, which assumed that there is a demand and a supply for regulation in 
the same way that there is for any other commodity,90 modern learning on 
the economic theory of regulation posits a model that includes a more so-
phisticated conception of the behavior of individual legislators. This update 
to the economic theory of regulation, most closely associated with Fred 
McChesney,91 replaces the earlier conception of lawmakers as passive sup-
pliers of regulation to the highest bidders with a model in which lawmakers 
are active participants who seek out opportunities to extract donations and 
other forms of support. 
The model extends the [traditional] economic theory of regulation to 
include the gains available to politician-maximizers from alleviating 
costs threatened or actually imposed on private actors by legislators 
themselves and by specialized bureaucratic agencies. Status as a legis-
lator confers a property right not only to create political rents but also 
to impose costs that would destroy private rents. In order to protect 
these returns, private owners have an incentive to strike bargains with 
                                                                                                                 
89 Omri Yadlin helped me sort out the analysis of this paragraph. 
90 Typified by George J. Stigler, The Theory of Economic Regulation , 2 Bell J Econ & Mgmt Sci 
3 (1971); Sam Peltzman, Toward a More General Theory of Regulation, 19 J L & Econ 211 (1976); 
Gary S. Becker, A Theory of Competition among Pressure Groups for Political Influence, 98 Q J Econ 
371 (1983). See also Jonathan R. Macey and Geoffrey P. Miller, Toward an Interest-Group Theory of 
Delaware Corporate Law, 65 Tex L Rev 469 (1987), which applies the classical economic theory of 
regulation to explain Delaware’s corporate law prominence. 
91 See generally McChesney, Money for Nothing (cited in note 13); McChesney, 16 J Legal Stud 
101 (cited in note 13). See also McChesney, 6 Indep Rev 345 (cited in note 13). 
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legislators, as long as the side payments to politicians are lower than 
the losses expected from the law threatened.92 
It is in this light that we can better understand the political economy of 
the Tillman Act and its state law analogues, for it is in this light that a fresh 
look at the historical record, both the legislative history and contemporane-
ous news accounts, reveals a coherent story. The story, as detailed in the 
next Part, is one of systematic shakedowns of corporations at the turn of the 
century leading to the passage of the Tillman Act.93 Thus, even if these laws 
facilitate rather than frustrate efforts by large corporations to seek rents 
through redistributive legislation (by reducing corporate exposure to extor-
tive ultimatums), the statutes may still be defended on the alternative 
ground that by preventing extortion they preserve the socially desirable in-
centive for innovation. The statutes ensure that the increased profits which 
stem from that innovation flow to shareholders rather than elected offi-
cials.94 
D. The Tillman Act 
1. Political entrepreneurship. 95 
The passage of the 1907 Tillman Act (and its state law analogues96) is 
usually explained as a product of political entrepreneurship by opportunistic 
politicians who capitalized on the Progressive Era’s distrust of large corpo-
rations generally and a few salient corporate campaign finance scandals in 
particular.97 As one commentator expressed it, “To save democracy from 
                                                                                                                 
92 McChesney, Money for Nothing  at 41 (cited in note 13). See also Strauss, 94 Colum L Rev at 
1380–82 (cited in note 13); Strauss, 1995 U Chi Legal F at 152–55 (cited in note 13). 
93 This view of the Tillman Act, as an anti-extortion device, is noted though not explored in detail 
in Butler and Ribstein, The Corporation and the Constitution at 76 (cited in note 8), and Ribstein, 49 
Wash & Lee L Rev at 154–55 (cited in note 8).  
94 See McChesney, Money for Nothing at 32–34 (cited in note 13). 
95 On political entrepreneurs, see, for example, William W. Buzbee, Urban Sprawl, Federalism, 
and the Problem of Institutional Complexity, 68 Fordham L Rev 57, 129–31 (1999); Daniel A. Farber, 
Politics and Procedure in Enviro nmental Law, 8 J L, Econ, & Org 59, 65–70 (1992).  
96 Most of the comparable state statutes are of a similar historical pedigree. See Sikes, State and 
Federal Corrupt Practices Legislation at 279–83 (cited in note 4) (listing states that prohibited corporate 
contributions near the turn of the century). 
97 See, for example, George Thayer, Who Shakes the Money Tree?: American Campaign Financ-
ing Practices from 1789 to the Present 53–54 (Simon & Schuster 1973) (summarizing a few of the rea-
sons for the passage of the Tillman Act); Bradley A. Smith, Unfree Speech: The Folly of Campaign Fi-
nance Reform  23–24 (Princeton 2001) (citing a New York legislative investigation into insurance com-
panies’ large donations to national politicians as an important factor in leading to the passage of the 
Tillman Act); Epstein, Corporations, Contributions, and Political Campaigns at 11–12 (cited in note 8) 
(arguing that “[t]he presidential election of 1904 was the catalyst that brought about the federal legisla-
tion regulating corporate campaign contributions” and explaining congressional action in enacting the 
Tillman Act); Sikes, State and Federal Corrupt-Practices Legislation  at 188–92 (cited in note 4) (re-
counting corporations’ contributions and active support of the Republican Party in the election of 1896, 
President Theodore Roosevelt’s disdain for these actions, and Co ngress’s passage of the Tillman Act); 
Winkler, 32 Loyola LA L Rev at 1246–47 (cited in note 8) (“The Tillman Act was justified by many on 
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oligarchic capital, electoral reformers organized to ‘purify the politic s’ of 
American government.”98  
Certainly the idea that political entrepreneurship played a role in the 
passage of the Tillman Act finds support in the historical record. The presi-
dential election of 1904, in particular, was marked by numerous appeals to 
voters in which the candidates spoke of the evils stemming from the “cor-
ruptive” influence of large corporations.99 According to contemporaneous 
media accounts, “the collection and acceptance of contributions from Trusts 
and corporations [was] the dominant issue of the campaign,”100 and in the 
wake of the 1904 election, charges of improper fundraising abounded.101 
Many specifically crit icized President Roosevelt for appointing a former 
cabinet Secretary as chairman of the Republican National Convention.102 
This criticism prompted Roosevelt to call for election reform in his 1905 
message to Congress,103 and that message has since been credited with hav-
                                                                                                                 
equality grounds to restrict the corrupting influence of corporations in politics.”); Mutch, Campaigns, 
Congress, and the Courts 1–8 (cited in note 5) (citing corporations’ contributions to the Republican 
Party during the 1904 presidential campaign as the reason for Congress’s passage of the Tillman Act). 
The national market for corporate charters was at the time just beginning, which aggravated the already 
poor public estimation of large corporations. See Liggett Co v Lee, 288 US 517, 567 (1933) (Brandeis 
dissenting) (criticizing this development and the “Frankenstein monster” corporation it engendered); 
Butler and Ribstein, The Corporation and the Constitution  at 72 (cited in note 8) (mentioning that cor-
porate speech restrictions arose “in the early part of the twentieth century, during a time of general dis-
trust of large institutions that fueled the Populist and Progressive movements”). 
98 Winkler, 32 Loyola LA L Rev at 1246 (cited in note 8). 
99 See Mutch, Campaigns, Congress, and the Courts at 1–2 (cited in note 5) (explaining how 
Democrats and Republicans accused each other of unethically accepting significant contributions from 
corporations); Bo lton, 22 Ariz L Rev at 377 & n 18 (cited in note 8) (describing the outrage of 1904 
presidential candidate Alton B. Parker and Congress at the excessive corporate contributions to political 
candidates). 
100 The Dominant Issue—“Buying the President”, NY Times 8 (Nov 7, 1904). Commentators have 
since agreed. See James K. Pollock, Jr., Party Campaign Funds 9 (Knopf 1926) (recounting how the 
Democratic candidate for the presidency during the 1904 election, Judge Alton B. Parker, “charged that 
corporations were supplying funds for the Republican campaign in order to buy influence with the Ad-
ministration”). 
101 See Epstein, Corporations, Contributions, and Political Campaigns at 11–12 (cited in note 8) 
(discussing the accusations of improper corporate contributions to political parties heard by Congress). 
Contemporaneous examples include Thunder of Cheers Greets Judge Parker, NY Times 1 (Nov 1, 
1904); Judge Parker’s Great Service to the Country, NY Times 8 (Nov 7, 1904); Demand for Cortelyou 
in Insurance Inquiry , NY Times 2 (Dec 3, 1905); To Bar Corporation Cash in Campaigns, NY Times 1 
(Jan 22, 1907); 41 Cong Rec H 1452 (Jan 21, 1907) (Representative Robinson) (“[I]t is an undisputed 
fact to-day that some of the great corporations of this country, in order to corrupt the electorates of this 
Republic, took from their treasuries in the last national campaign many thousands of dollars.”). 
102 See, for example, Buying the President, NY Times 8 (Oct 1, 1904) (arguing that President Ro o-
sevelt’s appointment of a former cabinet secretary was “scandalous”). This charge is explored more 
fully below. See notes 124–27 and accompanying text. 
103 President’s Annual Message, 40 Cong Rec S at 96 (cited in note 45) (quoting President Roose-
velt’s 1905 message to Congress and his call for federal election campaign contribution reform). See 
Mutch, Campaigns, Congress, and the Courts at 3–4 (cited in note 5) (discussing President Roosevelt’s 
meeting with advisors about the issue of corporate contributions to election campaigns and his ultimate 
decision to call for election reform). 
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ing set in motion the enactment of the 1907 Tillman Act.104 For although 
Senator William E. Chandler had introduced a similar measure in 1901, it 
was only when the issue achieved popular salience after the 1904 election 
scandals that the proposal got anywhere.105 Two months after Roosevelt’s 
speech, Senator Benjamin R. “Pitchfork Ben” Tillman, for whom the 1907 
Act is named, seized on Chandler’s initiative and assumed sponsorship of 
the legislation. Tillman did so because it would cause “some uneasiness” 
for various Republican legislators while at the same time would attract pub-
lic attention to him and give him a measure of control over the new Con-
gress’s legislative agenda.106 Thus, “In the election year 1906, Republicans 
might have allowed the bill to expire quietly in committee had not Tillman 
kept the issue alive with his resolution.”107  
When one adds the supposition that labor probably supported the 
Tillman Act in order to lessen the influence of capital, the Act’s lineage 
seems to come together. Certainly cabining the ability of management to 
purchase legislation would be advantageous to labor. But for one mediocre 
and one compelling reason this simple account of the enactment of the 
Tillman Act, without more, is not satisfactory. First, in the 1940s the 
Tillman Act was amended to apply with equal force to unions.108 Yet if labor 
                                                                                                                 
104 Mutch, Campaigns, Congress, and the Courts at 4 (cited in note 5) (“President Roosevelt’s 
1905 message to Congress is generally regarded as having initiated the series of actions ending in the 
1907 enactment of a prohibition on corporate political contributions.”); Sikes, State and Federal Cor-
rupt-Practices Legislation at 190–91 (cited in note 4) (mentioning that shortly after President Roosevelt 
addressed Congress about his proposals for election reform, Congress enacted a statute reflecting his 
proposals). When introducing the bill only two months after the speech, Contributions by Corporations 
in Political Campaigns, 59th Cong, 1st Sess, in 40 Cong Rec S 2642 (Feb 19, 1906), Tillman quoted 
“copiously from the president’s message.” Mutch, Campaigns, Congress, and the Courts at 6 (cited in 
note 5). And in the debates in the House the following year, Roosevelt’s remarks were referred to on 
several occasions. See, for example, 41 Cong Rec H at 1452 (Representative Rucker) (cited in note 101) 
(noting that reform was “strongly indorsed by the President . . . in his annual message”); id at 1453 
(Representative Hardwick) (“The President of the United States . . . has himself recommended its pas-
sage in his message to the Congress.”). 
105 See Mutch, Campaigns, Congress, and the Courts at 4–6 (cited in note 5) (describing how the 
press ignored Chandler’s proposal until after the 1904 election campaign finance scandals and the New 
York Armstrong Committee investigation).  
106 Id at 5–6 (explaining Senator Tillman’s efforts to keep his bill for election reform alive). See 40 
Cong Rec S at 2642 (cited in note 104) (quoting congressional debate on the proposed Tillman Act). See 
generally Wendy J. Schiller, Senators as Political Entrepreneurs: Using Bill Sponsorship to Shape Leg-
islative Agendas, 39 Am J Polit Sci 186 (1995) (analyzing the conditions under which senators will 
sponsor legislation). 
107 Mutch, Campaigns, Congress, and the Courts at 6 (cited in note 5) (“Tillman’s persistence 
might have been intended to keep his bill in the public eye.”). 
108 Labor Management Relations Act of 1947 (“Taft-Hartley Act”), Pub L No 100, 61 Stat 136, 
159, codified at 29 USC §§ 151–66 (1947). See also United States v International Union Automobile 
Workers, 352 US 567, 582–83 (1956) (noting that the Labor Management Relations Act of 1947 was 
amended to apply also to unions). See Epstein, Corporations, Contributions, and Political Campaigns at 
13–14 (cited in note 8) (noting that Congress restricted union campaign contributions in § 304 of the 
Labor Management Relations Act of 1947); Comment, The Regulation of Union Political Activity: Ma-
jority and Minority Rights and Remedies, 126 U Pa L Rev 386, 393–94 (1977) (same); Larry J. Sabato, 
PAC Power: Inside the World of Political Action Committees 5–6 (Norton 1984) (same).  
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had been the driving force behind limiting corporate political speech, and if 
the Tillman Act had truly lessened corporate influence, we would have ex-
pected corporate limits to be ratcheted up, not the subsequent establishment 
of limitations on unions.109 And anyway, at the time of the Tillman Act’s 
passage, labor for the most part had not yet organized.110  
Second, and this is the more compelling argument against the notion 
that political entrepreneurship satisfactorily explains the Tillman Act, there 
is an alternative though somewhat complementary political economy story 
that is equally if not more consistent with the historical record—a record 
that is devoid of clear evidence of strong opposition by corporations. This 
complementary explanation is also consistent with modern learning on the 
economic theory of regulation. Simply put, corporations probably supported 
the enactment of the Tillman Act as a means of protecting themselves from 
extortive threats by political leaders seeking campaign contributions.  
2. Political extortion. 
To begin with, the Tillman Act should be placed in its specific cam-
paign finance historical context. The public controversy regarding the role 
of corporate money in the 1904 election, to which we shall return more 
comprehensively shortly, represented the natural escalation of a process be-
gun in the campaigns of the late 1800s.111 For it was in the elections of the 
late 1880s and the 1890s that the national parties began shouldering a larger 
                                                                                                                 
109 The fact that the historical record contains strong evidence that unions opposed the later exten-
sion of the statute to cover them, see William S. White, Veto Tactic Delays Senate Labor Vote: Foes As-
sail Bill to Set Case for Rejection—Tell Truman Signing Means ’48 Defeat, NY Times 1 (June 6, 1947) 
(noting union demonstrations against the provision); Joseph A. Loftus, AFL Calls Illegal Two Points in 
Law: Will Advise Unions to Violate Ban on Political Spending and Red Disclaimer, NY Times 1 (June 
29, 1947) (“American Federation of Labor lawyers put their fingers today on at least two provisions of 
the Taft -Hartley Law which they regard as so clearly unconstitutional that they will advise their unions 
to violate them.”); Louis Stark, Unions Widen Attacks on Taft-Hartley Law: Defiance of Ban against Po-
litical Funds Is Now Major Challenge, NY Times B7 (Aug 17, 1947) (detailing the challenges unions 
mounted against the Taft-Hartley Act), does not undercut the contention that corporations supported or 
at least did not seriously oppose the 1907 enactment. First, that there is compelling evidence of union 
opposition to this extension bolsters the inference that there was no similar systematic corporate opposi-
tion to the 1907 enactment, because there is a lack of comparable good evidence of opposition by corpo-
rations to the original 1907 enactment. Second, the extension of the Act to unions came in the wake of a 
similar provision in the 1943 War Labor Disputes Act (“Smith-Connally Act”), 57 Stat 163, 167–68 
(prohibiting political contributions by labor organizations), repealed by 62 Stat 683, 862 (1948), rather 
than, as explored below, in the wake of massive “assessments” by political leaders. Third, as a practical 
matter, it would be more difficult for unions to evade the limitation by funneling donations through un-
ion leaders in the form of increased compensation, because the practical ceiling on union leader com-
pensation is lower than that on corporate executive compensation. 
110 Lambert, 40 NYU L Rev at 1035 (cited in note 8) (explaining that “during the latter part of the 
nineteenth century and the beginning of the twentieth[,] [l]abor was still largely unorganized”). 
111 See Smith, Unfree Speech at 21–22 (cited in note 97); Sikes, State and Federal Corrupt-
Practices Legislation  at 188–89 (cited in note 4); Epstein, Corporations, Contributions, and Political 
Campaigns at 10–11 (cited in note 8); Adam Winkler, “Other People’s Money”: Corporate Contribution 
Bans and the Separation of Ownership and Control 11–13, working paper (2001) (on file with author). 
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share of the burden.112 This meant that the then “customary method of vol-
untary contribution, helped out by a little dunning of the protected manufac-
turers, was wholly insufficient.”113 So the national political parties for the 
first time deployed sophisticated and systematic procedures for demanding 
contributions for their candidates from corporations in particular. Not coin-
cidentally, this occurred soon after the Pendleton Act of 1883 banned con-
tributions, often extorted, from civil servants.114 
In the 1896 election, the first of two in which William McKinley de-
feated William Jennings Bryan, the dominant issue was monetary policy. So 
Mark Hanna, the Republican party leader who was ult imately responsible 
for raising money for McKinley, focused his fundraising efforts on New 
York financiers and large corporations.115 Standard Oil was taxed, as it 
were, $250,000, and under Hanna’s stewardship the Republican National 
Committee assessed banks at one-quarter of one percent of their capital.116 
As his biographer put it, Hanna “did his best to convert the practice from a 
matter of political begging on the one side and donating on the other into a 
matter of systematic assessment according to the means of the individual 
                                                                                                                 
112 See Sikes, State and Federal Corrupt-Practices Legislation at 188 (cited in note 4); Thomas E. 
Felt, The Rise of Mark Hanna 342, unpublished Michigan State University Ph.D. dissert ation (1961); 
Fred C. Shoemaker, Mark Hanna and the Transformation of the Republican Party 209, unpublished 
Ohio State University Ph.D. dissertation (1992). See also Shoemaker, Mark Hanna and the Transforma-
tion of the Republican Party at 226; Thayer, Who Shakes the Money Tree at 48 (cited in note 97). 
113 Herbert Croly, Marcus Alonzo Hanna: His Life and Work 213–19 (Macmillan 1912). See also 
Sikes, State and Federal Corrupt-Practices Legislation at 188–89 (cited in note 4); Thayer, Who Shakes 
the Money Tree at 49 (cited in note 97). 
114 See Smith, Unfree Speech at 20 (cited in note 97) (observing that the Pendleton Act, which lim-
ited “the ability of officeholders to extract contributions from those they appointed to office,” is often 
considered to have been the first campaign finance law); Thayer, Who Shakes the Money Tree at 38–40 
(cited in note 97) (“Business became a prime source of campaign funds after the passage of the Pendle-
ton Act of 1883, a law that banned contributions from civil servants.”). 
115 Croly, Marcus Alonzo Hanna at 219–20 (cited in note 113); Sikes, State and Federal Corrupt-
Practices Legislation at 189 (cited in note 4) (“Hanna converted the practice of soliciting contributions 
from a matter of political beginning into a matter of systematic assessment according to the means of the 
individual and institution. . . . Standard Oil Company contributed $250,000 to be used by Mr. Hanna in 
the campaign.”). See also Clarence A. Stern, Resurgent Republicanism: The Handiwork of Hanna  25–26 
(Edwards Brothers 1963) (“[Hanna] overcame the initial reluctance of Wall Street financiers to making 
generous campaign contributions, and he gave the major portion of his time to the collection of funds in 
New York.”); Felt, Rise of Mark Hanna  at 342–46 (cited in note 112); Smith, Unfree Speech at 22 (cited 
in note 97) (“Hanna methodically ‘assessed’ the nation’s leading businesses for campaign cash.”). 
116 Winkler, 32 Loyola LA L Rev at 1247 (cited in note 8) (noting that Standard Oil “was required 
to contribute $250,000 to the 1896 Republican presidential campaign”); Thayer, Who Shakes the Money 
Tree at 50 (cited in note 97) (“Banks . . . were assessed one quarter of one percent of their capital; Stan-
dard Oil contributed about a quarter of a million dollars, and large insurance companies slightly less.”); 
Croly, Marcus Alonzo Hanna at 220 (cited in note 113) (stating that Standard Oil Company gave 
$250,000, and that the Republican National Committee assessed banks at a rate “of one-quarter of one 
per cent of their capital”). See also Lambert, 40 NYU L Rev at 1035 (cited in note 8) (“Hanna super-
vised the collection and expenditure of perhaps as much as $16 million, an enormous sum for [1896], by 
systemizing contributions from the business community, particularly the larger corporations.”); Felt, The 
Rise of Mark Hanna  at 347 (cited in note 112). 
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and institution.”117 No doubt designed to take advantage of the collective ac-
tion problem facing those being leaned on, solicitation letters often included 
the names of competitors who had made pledges and the amounts of those 
pledges.118 Party affiliation did not matter; members of both parties were 
simply assessed their shares by Hanna and his staff.119  
In this extortion-colored light, consider the remark of Representative 
Williams during the House debate on its version of the Tillman Act with re-
spect to a donation by Democratic managers of New York Life to a Repub-
lican campaign: the episode, said Williams, represented “all the more sad a 
commentary, because it shows that even Democrats, when identified with 
great corporations, are compelled to contribute Democratic money to Re-
publican campaign funds in order to expect justice from a Republican Ad-
ministration.”120 With this comment Williams articulated precisely the 
change in the turn-of-the-century forms of campaign finance. Indeed, for 
McKinley’s 1900 reelection campaign, Hanna “further [ ] systematize[d] 
the work of collection,”121 and “[w]ith his customary efficiency, Hanna 
shook down the business world for $2.5 million.” 122 Contribution levels 
were assessed by party leaders, and contributions above and below these 
assessments were returned!123  
Returning now to the 1904 election controversy, in which, as noted 
earlier, charges of improper fundraising abounded—which charges 
prompted Roosevelt’s 1905 call for reform and ultimately the 1907 Act—it 
is worth considering the specific content of those allegations. Many of the 
                                                                                                                 
117 Croly, Marcus Alonzo Hanna at 220, 222 (cited in note 113). See also Thayer, Who Shakes the 
Money Tree at 49 (cited in note 97) (“But he did systematize the collection of funds and, for better or for 
worse, raised the level of the entire financial operation of campaigns out of the trough of blackmail and 
bribery.”); Felt, Rise of Mark Hanna at 370 (cited in note 112) (“He had raised and spent unprecedented 
campaign funds, not merely by discreet begging but by systematic demands on banks and other busi-
nesses benefited by his candidate’s tariff and currency policies.”). Croly had access to Hanna’s private 
papers, which have since been destroyed. Thus the Croly biography, which is said to “sketch[ ] a full 
portrait of Hanna’s public and private life,” is regarded as “the single best authority of Hanna’s private 
life, including many of his private and political arrangements.” Shoemaker, Mark Hanna at 5 (cited in 
note 112).  
118 Sikes, State and Federal Corrupt-Practices Legislation  at 189–90 (cited in note 4) (describing 
the campaign letters the Nat ional Bankers’ Association sent to all its bankers in light of the political 
campaign of 1896).  
119 Croly, Marcus Alonzo Hanna at 220, 222 (cited in note 113) (“[A]ppeals were made to banks 
and business men, irrespective of party affiliations.”). 
120 41 Cong Rec H at 1454 (cited in note 101). 
121 Croly, Marcus Alonzo Hanna at 325 (cited in note 113); Felt, The Rise of Mark Hanna  at 351–
52 (cited in note 112). 
122 Thayer, Who Shakes the Money Tree at 51 (cited in note 97). 
123 Croly, Marcus Alonzo Hanna at 325 (cited in note 113) (“In case an exceptionally opulent cor-
poration or business firm contributed decidedly less than was considered its fair proportion, the checque 
might be returned. . . . On the other hand, an excessively liberal subscription might also be sent back in 
part.”). See also Thayer, Who Shakes the Money Tree at 50 (cited in note 97) (“If a company sent in a 
check Hanna believed to be too small, it was returned; if a company paid too much, a refund was sent 
out.”). 
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complaints charged in particular that it was improper for Roosevelt to have 
appointed former Secretary of Commerce and Labor George Cortelyou to 
head the Republican National Committee,124 because the Department of 
Commerce and Labor’s Bureau of Corporations had the authority to inves-
tigate corporations doing interstate business. Thus, The New York Times al-
leged wrongdoing “when the chief of the Department which has become the 
custodian of corporation secrets is put at the head of the partisan committee 
whose principal function is to collect campaign contributions which come 
chiefly from great corporations.”125 Although there was no proof of actual 
wrongdoing by Cortelyou, the commonly held belief was that in a typical 
fundraising visit,  
Chairman Cortelyou goes to one of the officers of a large corporation 
and informs him that the Republican National Committee expects a 
substantial contribution from his company. The officer in question is 
surprised; he is not of Mr. Roosevelt’s party, neither he nor his corpo-
ration has been accustomed to meddle with politics; he asks for time 
to think it over. In the solitude of his office his thoughts run in this 
wise: I do not want to give money to the Republican National Com-
mittee. But I am trustee of the interests of the stockholders of this cor-
poration. I may soon have to appear before this man as a representa-
tive of my corporation in a matter affecting its business, as to which 
he will have, if not official discretion, at least very great personal and 
official influence, which I would dislike to have used against me. I 
cannot let my personal disinclinations stand in the way of the com-
pany’s interests. I will make this forced contribution to Mr. Corte-
lyou’s fund. 126  
This hypothetical account does not appear to be hyperbolic. In Sep-
tember of 1905, for example, it was reported that during a Bureau of Corpo-
rations investigation into certain Chicago packing companies, “a demand 
was made upon them for $50,000.”127  
                                                                                                                 
124 It was also thought to be improper for Cortelyou to have been rewarded with a plum polit ical 
appointment afterward. See 41 Cong Rec H at 1453 (cited in note 101) (Representative Robinson) (in 
the House debate on the Tillman Act, referring to the “fact that the chairman of the last national Repub-
lican committee who received these funds has been promoted in office”). Cortelyou was made Secretary 
of the Treasury.  
125 Buying the President, NY Times at 8 (cited in note 102). See also Publicity for National and 
State Campaign Funds, 49 Harper’s Weekly 1767 (Nov 25, 1905) (“It is not certain that Mr. Cortelyou, 
by accepting and using the contributions of the corporations referred to, made himself a party to an em-
bezzlement, or, in other words, to the diversion of funds whereof the pretended donors were only trus-
tees, without the consent of the real owners.”); Thunder of Cheers Greets Judge Parker, NY Times at 1 
(cited in note 101); Judge Parker’s Great Service to the Country, NY Times at 8 (cited in note 101); 
Demand for Cortelyou in Insurance Inquiry, NY Times at 2 (cited in note 101); To Bar Corporation 
Cash in Campaigns, NY Times 1 (June 22, 1907) (referring to an allegation of “Cortelyou’s holding up 
various corporations”).  
126 Id. See also Demand for Cortelyou in Insurance Inquiry, NY Times at 2 (cited in note 101). 
127 Cash from the Packers: Story of a Republican Demand While the Beef Inquiry Was On , NY 
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The reports of the time, moreover, are replete in particular with inter-
ventions by insurance companies, to the tune of tens of thousands of dol-
lars,128 which is similarly consistent with an extortion story. Because they 
are subject to so much governmental oversight, insurance companies are 
especially vulnerable to extortive threats. Thus it should come as no sur-
prise that many of the turn-of-the-century allegations of extortion and other 
election funding improprieties as reported in both contemporaneous news 
accounts and a high-profile 1905 New York legislative investigation in-
volved insurance companies.129 These various insurance scandals figure sig-
nificantly in the legislative history of the Tillman Act,130 and the investiga-
tion gave salience to the issue.131 
 On this view the exorbitant corporate campaign contributions of the 
late 1800s and early 1900s did represent inefficient redistribution—only the 
rents were being had by polit icians at the expense of shareholders. This is 
not to say that these corporations were not engaged in socially undesirable 
rent seeking. Rather, the point is that legislators, as sellers, play as active a 
role in the market for legislation as potential buyers such as corporations. 
To the extent that they will therefore actively raise funds through threats 
and other means, acquiescing in a ban on direct corporate contributions 
would be a rational corporate response.  
Not surprisingly, corporate leaders embraced the Tillman Act for pre-
cisely that reason. As a Republican State Committee member observed of 
corporate leaders: They are “entranced with happiness. . . . [T]hey are now 
in a position to toe us unceremoniously out of the door if we ask them for a 
penny . . . . They mean to take advantage of the laws forbidding them to 
give money for political purposes.”132 Indeed, consider this reaction of a 
                                                                                                                 
Times 2 (Sept 17, 1905). 
128 Parker on Corporate Corruption of Parties, NY Times 1 (Sept 18, 1905) (discussing New York 
Life’s $50,000 contribution). See also Mutch, Campaigns, Congress, and the Courts at 2 (cited in note 
5) (“The political power wielded by insurance companies in New York State, particularly by the ‘big 
three’ of New York, Mutual, and Equitable Life, had been the subject of rumor and suspicion for dec-
ades before the appointment of a joint state legislative committee to investigate the industry in 1905.”).  
129 For more on the Armstrong Committee investigation, see Mutch, Campaigns, Congress, and 
the Courts at 2–3 (cited in note 5); Sikes, State and Federal Corrupt-Practices Legislation at 108–10 
(cited in note 4) (discussing evidence uncovered by the Armstrong Committee). For news accounts, see, 
for example, Parkers Friends Asked for Money, NY Times 1 (Sept 21, 1905) (stating that the president 
of a New York insurance company declared on the stand during the Armstrong Committee investigation 
“that the Democratic candidates, including ex-Judge Parker and the Chairman of the Democratic Na-
tional and State Committees, were ‘chasing’ him for money in last Fall’s campaign.”); Demand for Cor-
telyou in Insurance Inquiry, NY Times at 2 (cited in note 101); Mr. Perkins’s Position, NY Times 8 (Mar 
9, 1907) (condemning the Republican National Committee for taking excessive corporate contributions).  
130 See, for example, 41 Cong Rec H at 1451–55 (cited in note 101) (recounting House debate on 
the Tillman Act, which contains numerous references to the contributions). 
131 See Winkler, “Other People’s Money” at 16–24 (cited in note 111). Winkler argues that it was 
the Armstrong Committee hearings that prompted the enactment of these statutes and that the statutes’ 
primary motivation was the protection of shareholders.  
132 Happy Corporations, NY Times 8 (June 17, 1906).  
Hosted by The Berkeley Electronic Press
32 Competition for Corporate Charters 
“great financial authority” to the Senate’s passage of the statute,133 which 
was reported in an editorial entitled Happy Corporations: “[We] welcome [ 
] this legislation with very much the same emotions with which a serf 
would his liberation from a tyrannous autocrat.134”  
In this extortion-colored light, moreover, not only do these reported re-
sponses of corporate leaders to the statute’s passage make sense, but so 
does the statute’s limited scope. The Tillman Act left intact donations other 
than direct contributions or independent expenditures on behalf of specific 
candidates, and thus the Act would not touch donations funneled through 
managers in the form of increased compensation.135 This porousness was 
not an oversight. Congress rejected more restrictive proposals 136 even 
though the porousness of the Tillman Act’s proscriptions was widely known 
at the time of its enactment,137 and even though the 1905 presidential mes-
                                                                                                                 
133 40 Cong Rec S 8163 (June 9, 1906) (reporting the passage of the Tillman Act). For contempora-
neous coverage, see Election Funds Will Suffer, NY Times 3 (June 10, 1906) (reporting that the Senate 
passed a bill prohibiting money gift s by corporations to election campaigns). After the midterm elections 
Representative Joseph Gaines introduced the legislation in the House. 41 Cong Rec H at 1451 (Represen-
tative Gaines) (cited in note 101) (introducing legislation “to prohibit corporations from making money 
contributions in connection with political elections”). 
134  Happy Corporations, NY Times at 8 (cited in note 132). 
135 Details and examples are given in  Epstein, Corporations, Contributions, and Political Cam-
paigns at 59–78 (cited in note 8). See also 93 Cong Rec S 1604 (June 6, 1947) (Senator Kilgore) 
(“Every one knows the way they get around the prohibition against corporate contributions, by simply 
declaring bonuses to certain officials, which can be used for political purposes.”); 93 Cong Rec H 3522 
(Apr 16, 1947) (Representative Miller) (detailing specific examples); Sabato, PAC Power at 4 (cited in 
note 108). See also Smith, Unfree Speech  at 24 (cited in note 97) (“Although the Tillman Act may have 
reduced corporate participation in politics it hardly served to eliminate it” because some managers 
“made large personal contributions with the knowledge that they would be reimbursed by their corporate 
employers.”). 
136 “The 1909 Congress witnessed unsuccessful attempts to amend the [Tillman] Act to proscribe 
the contribution of anything of value and to extend its application to the election of state legislatures.” 
United States v International Union Automobile Workers, 352 US 567, 575 (1956). See 42 Cong Rec H 
696–703 (Jan 14, 1908) (recounting the congressional debate about extending the application of the 
Tillman Act to the election of state legislatures and proscribing corporate contributions of anything of 
value and the congressional opposition to these proposed amendments); 44 Cong Rec H 4595 (July 23, 
1909) (reporting the congressional debate about amending the Tillman Act to prohibit “Congress and the 
courts from receiving valuable gifts, employment, or compensation of any kind from public-service cor-
porations, trusts, and persons engaged in interstate commerce, or having an interest in legislation” and 
the tabling of that debate and, thus, that proposed amendment). See also Mutch, Campaigns, Congress, 
and the Courts at 8–16 (cited in note 5) (giving an account of congressional opposition to proposed 
amendments that would increase the reach of the Tillman Act). 
137 See, for example, 41 Cong Rec H at 1454 (Representative Grosvenor) (cited in note 101) 
(“[The Tillman Act] does not go far enough. If you want to purify the politics of this country by an as-
surance that there shall be no corrupting of the voters at the polls, you must go further than to suppress 
national corporations.”); Tribute from Corporations, NY Times 2 (Aug 19, 1908); Happy Corporations, 
NY Times at 8 (cited in note 132) (explaining that the Tillman Act was porous because it was foresee-
able that corporations that were restricted from donating to national political campaigns would contrib-
ute to state polit ical campaigns). See also 66 Cong Rec H 3664 (Feb 13, 1925) (criticizing the current 
election law of 1925 because “reports [were] made by political committees just before and immediately 
after elections. The public [had] no knowledge of contributions made in the meantime.”); 41 Cong Rec 
H at 1452 (Representative Robinson) (cited in note 101) (arguing that the Tillman Act “does not go far 
enough. We ought to include all corporations engaged in interstate commerce, and we ought also to pro-
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sage to Congress that had set in motion the passage of the Act called for a 
total ban on donations by corporations “for any political purpose.”138 Thus, 
after the Tillman Act’s enactment, corporations could still purchase legisla-
tion through many remaining indirect means, albeit at a higher price. But 
the cumbersomeness and increased costs of the remaining methods—
consider the tax consequences and time delay of funneling a donation 
through managers as increased compensation—would provide an excuse for 
the inability to respond swiftly and fully to an extortive ult imatum. True, 
“soft-money” donations are relatively easy to make and were not covered 
by the statute. But this fact does not undercut the foregoing analysis of the 
statute’s enactment and durability as the soft-money donation was largely 
unknown until 1988. 139 Indeed, as will be explored in greater detail below,140 
a similar confluence of factors—the innovation of a new fundraising tech-
nique followed several election cycles later by rampant corporate donations, 
political entrepreneurship, and anecdotal evidence of extortion—may be 
found in the current debate over banning soft-money donations.  
Returning to 1907, the point that the limited scope of the statute would 
allow corporations to continue to purchase desired legislation (in the Stigler 
model) while reducing exposure to extortive ultimatums (in the McChesney 
model) did not go unnoticed by contemporary observers. Consider the 
analysis of the Times upon the Act’s passage in the Senate:  
[The Act] will lessen a very mean and sordid practice of blackmail. 
The beneficiaries of [regulation] will still find methods of furnishing 
the sinews of war to the party that controls their favors, but the great 
number of corporations that have suffered extortion through weakness 
and cowardice will have their backbones stiffened, and parties will be 
put to it to fill their coffers by really voluntary contributions.141 
                                                                                                                 
vide an effective means for discovering violations of the law and for the enforcement of its provi-
sions.”). Compare 89 Cong Rec S 5781 (June 12, 1943) (Senator Bone) (objecting to subjecting certain 
corporations to more regulatory restrictions). See also Winkler, 32 Loyola LA L Rev at 1251–52 (cited 
in note 8) (“Many legislators who supported the corporate contribution ban in 1907 would not be sur-
prised by the law’s ineffectiveness.”); Epstein, Corporations, Contributions, and Political Campaigns at 
59–60 (cited in note 8) (noting that “the inherent limitations of [campaign election contribution reform] 
legislation were recognized shortly after the Tillman Act of 1907 was passed”); note 135. 
138  President’s Annual Message, 40 Cong Rec S at 96 (cited in note 45). 
139 See Alison Mitchell, Fearing Limits on Soft Money, Parties Fill Coffers, NY Times A1, A16 
(Feb 11, 2002) (“[I]n 1988, the parties began taking soft money donations.”); Jill Abramson, The Hard 
Business of Soft Money , NY Times § 4 at  3 (Mar 26, 2000) (discussing the fundraisers behind the start of 
soft -money contributions in 1988); Christine Gorman, The Price of Power, Time 44 (Oct 31, 1988) (re-
counting how the Dukakis-Bush presidential race marked the beginning of soft-money fundraising); Re-
search and Policy Committee of the Committee for Economic Development, Investing in the People’s 
Business: A Business Proposal for Campaign Finance Reform  23–25 (CED 1999) (detailing the origins 
and growth of soft-money fundraising). 
140 See Part IV.A. 
141 Happy Corporations, NY Times at 8 (cited in note 132). 
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To the extortion thesis one might reply that it does not provide a total 
explanation for the Tillman Act’s enactment. Admittedly there must have 
been some political entrepreneurship at work, and this is consistent with the 
evidence adduced in Part II.D.1. Indeed, accepting a role for political entre-
preneurship is necessary to explain why legislators, who had been the prin-
cipal beneficiaries of the rent extraction discussed above, did in fact enact 
the Tillman Act. Senator Tillman and the Act’s other supporters capitalized 
on the political opportunity created by the level of political extortion having 
reached something of a popular “outrage constraint” 142 after the presidential 
election of 1904. Still, the anti-extortion account does fill some important 
gaps in the traditional political entrepreneurship view. Most notably, the ex-
tortion thesis helps explain the porousness of these laws. It is one thing for 
corporate leaders to acquiesce in the closing of the most obvious avenues of 
political extortion in the wake of systematic assessments and rampant po-
litical interventions. It would have been quite another to expect them to 
stand by if the statutes would have closed corporations off from the market 
for legislation entirely.  
 
*    *    *    *    * 
 
The foregoing analysis of the political economy of the longstanding 
discrimination against corporate political speech suggests that despite the 
incoherence of most of the conventional justif ications for section 441b and 
its state counterparts, these statutes may well be grounded in sound policy 
concerns. As Fred McChesney has explained, “Even if politicians eventu-
ally allow themselves to be bought off, their minatory presence reduces the 
expected value of entrepreneurial ability and specific -capital invest-
ments.”143 This, however, raises a new question: if the statutes do indeed 
serve a function that is consistent with maximizing shareholder welfare, 
what is the pertinence of Delaware’s not having one? 
III.   CORPORATE POLITICAL SPEECH AND DELAWARE 
This Part explores the relevance of the state law analogues of section 
441b—and the fact that Delaware is among the minority of states that does 
not discriminate against corporate political speech144—for the debate over 
the wisdom of corporate law federalism. Although section 441b applies to 
all state-chartered corporations, regardless of their state of incorporation, it 
does so only with regard to their participation in federal elections.145 The 
                                                                                                                 
142 Compare Lucian Arye Bebchuk, Jesse M. Fried, and David I. Walker, Managerial Power and 
Rent Extraction in the Design of Executive Compensation, 69 U Chi L Rev 751 (2002). 
143 McChesney, Money for Nothing at  33 (cited in note 13). 
144 See note 169. 
145 2 USC § 441b: 
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participation of state-chartered corporations in state elections is regulated 
only by the local election law of the relevant state. Thus, even though the 
law of the state in which the donation is made rather than the law of the 
state in which the corporation is chartered governs the legality of state-level 
corporate donations,146 state election law may nonetheless have an effect on 
the decision where to incorporate. The local regulation of corporate political 
speech is a relevant consideration in reckoning the responsiveness of local 
legislators to corporate needs.  
Part III.A outlines the history of the perennial debate over corporate 
regulatory competition and situates the analysis of this Article within that 
debate. Part III.B then assimilates into the corporate regulatory competition 
debate the McChesney economic model of regulation as applied in this Ar-
ticle to the question of corporate political speech. More specifically, Part 
III.B contends that the political economy of the ongoing discrimination 
against corporate political speech and the plausible public interest justific a-
tions for that discrimination offered above are consistent with Delaware’s 
not discriminating against corporate political speech. Part III.B also sug-
gests that this analysis supplements the traditional “credible commitment” 
explanation for the durability of Delaware’s dominance in the market for 
corporate charters. Finally, Part III.C contends that the unique institutional 
features of the political economy of Delaware identified in Part III.B result 
in a total social welfare gain. 
A. The Incorporation Debate 
There is a rich literature exploring the question of why most large 
firms incorporate in Delaware.147 The early view, championed most promi-
                                                                                                                 
It is unlawful . . . for any corporation whatever . . . to make a contribution or expenditure in con-
nection with any election at which presidential and vice presidential electors or a Senator or Rep-
resentative in, or a Delegate or Resident Commissioner to, Congress are to be voted for, or in con-
nection with any primary election or political convention or caucus held to select candidates for 
any of the foregoing offices, or for any candidate, political committee, or other person knowingly 
to accept or receive any contribution prohibited by this section, or any officer or any director of 
any corporation . . . to consent to any contribution or expenditure by the corporation, national 
bank, or labor organization, as the case may be, prohibited by this section. 
146 For the reasons discussed in Part II.B, any state that attempted to constrain the out -of-state po-
litical speech of firms incorporated within it would be disadvantaged in the competition for corporate 
charters.  
147 See, for example, Romano, 8 Cardozo L Rev 709 (cited in note 14); Lucian Arye Bebchuk, 
Federalism and the Corporation: The Desirable Limits on State Competition in Corporate Law, 105 
Harv L Rev 1437 (1992); Curtis Alva, Delaware and the Market for Corporate Charters: History and 
Agency, 15 Del J Corp L 885, 903 (1990); Romano, 1 J L, Econ, & Org 225 (cited in note 14); Melvin 
Aron Eisenberg, The Modernization of Corporate Law: An Essay for Bill Cary, 37 U Miami L Rev 187 
(1983); Daniel R. Fischel, The “Race to the Bottom” Revisited: Reflections on Recent Developments in 
Delaware’s Corporate Law, 76 Nw U L Rev 913 (1982); Ralph K. Winter, Jr., State Law, Shareholder 
Protection, and the Theory of the Corporation , 6 J Legal Stud 251 (1977); William L. Cary, Federalism 
and Corporate Law: Reflections upon Delaware, 83 Yale L J 663 (1974). 
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nently by Professor William Cary, was that the competition between the 
states to grant corporate charters led to a “race to the bottom” in state cor-
porate law. In the end, the argument goes, because Delaware offered man-
agers the corporate law most conducive to exploiting investors, managers 
incorporated in Delaware in order to facilitate the transfer of value from 
shareholders to themselves. In return, Delaware reaped the benefits of in-
creased tax and licensing revenues.148  
Shortly thereafter, market-oriented scholars beginning with then-
Professor Ralph Winter challenged the intellectual underpinnings of Cary’s 
vision. 149 As Frank Easterbrook and Daniel Fischel put it, “how could states’ 
competition to please managers be the only well-functioning market?”150 
Managers also compete in the market for corporate control and the market 
for capital. Their success in both will, in significant measure, be determined 
by their ability to navigate the firm successfully in the market in which the 
firm sells its products. Therefore, to keep the cost of capital down, which 
facilitates the firm’s competitiveness in the product market, and to keep the 
firm’s stock price high, which facilitates the managers’ competitiveness in 
the market for corporate control, managers would choose to incorporate in 
the state that provided the optimal bundle of shareholder protective law. In 
other words, the demand function for corporate law represents the aggrega-
tion of shareholder rather than managerial preferences. So the fact that most 
large publicly traded corporations chose Delaware meant that Delaware 
provided the most efficient corporate law. 
To say that competitive forces will result in optimal state law is a 
strong thesis, however—one that has been embarrassed somewhat by the 
proliferation of state antitakeover laws.151 But the thesis of the “race to the 
top” scholars may be recharacterized as suggesting that the competition be-
tween states for incorporations pushes the states towards law that benefits 
                                                                                                                 
148 Cary, 83 Yale L J 663 (cited in note 147). 
149 Winter, 6 J Legal Stud 251 (cited in note 147). 
150 Easterbrook and Fischel, Economic Structure of Corporate Law at 213 (cited in note 11). 
151 See Lucian Arye Bebchuk and Allen Ferrell, A New Approach to Takeover Law and Regulatory 
Competition, 87 Va L Rev 111, 118 (2001) (noting the increase in state laws that permit use of defensive 
tactics by incumbent management to stymie takeovers); Lucian Arye Bebchuk and Allen Ferrell, Feder-
alism and Corporate Law: The Race to Protect Managers from Takeovers, 99 Colum L Rev 1168, 1187 
(1999); Romano, 8 Cardozo L Rev at 726–28 (cited in note 14); Romano, 1 J L, Econ, & Org at 265–66 
(cited in note 14). Still, Delaware’s sluggish adoption of a considerably weaker statute than average 
suggests that the competition between the states does push towards shareholder-beneficial law. Roberta 
Romano, The Need for Competition in International Securities Regulation , 2 Theor Inq in L 387, 529–
37 (2001); Roberta Romano, Competition for Corporate Charters and the Lesson of Takeover Statutes, 
61 Fordham L Rev 843, 855–59 (1993); Romano, 8 Cardozo L Rev at 730–31 (cited in note 14); Daniel 
R. Fischel, From MITE to CTS: State Anti-Takeover Statutes, the Williams Act, the Commerce Clause, 
and Insider Trading, 1987 S Ct Rev 47, 68–71; Roberta Romano, The Political Economy of Takeover 
Statutes, 73 Va L Rev 111, 141 (1987). Consider also the story of how institutional investors in large 
Pennsylvania corporations forced widespread opting-out of Pennsylvania’s rigid antitakeover law. 
Romano, 2 Theor Inq in L at 535–37; Romano, 61 Fordham L Rev at 858–59; Leslie Wayne, Many 
Companies in Pennsylvania Reject State’s Takeover Protection, NY Times A1 (July 20, 1990). 
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shareholders.152 In that formulation, as a matter of theory, the advocates of 
the race to the top appear to be the winners.153 To borrow Judge Winter’s ar-
ticulation, if the competition between the states for corporate charters has 
not led to a “race” for the top, then it has at least led to “a leisurely walk” in 
that direction. 154 Moreover, so far as any of this is empirically verifiable, 
“The data are . . . most consistent with Winter’s hypothesis of the efficacy 
of competition.”155 Delaware corporate law appears to improve firm 
value.156 
Still, the market for corporate charters, like virtually all markets, is 
imperfect, and not only because of the agency between managers and 
shareholders that has been the princ ipal focus of most of the first generation 
of regulatory competition scholarship.157 Regardless of one’s take on the 
Cary/Winter debate about how well market forces align managers’ and 
shareholders’ interests, Delaware’s durable corporate law leadership is not 
fully explainable by the attractiveness of its law to managers one way or the 
other. Put another way, whether managers select Delaware because its law 
permits them to transfer value from shareholders to themselves, or because 
its law favors shareholders and therefore reduces the cost of capital, there 
must be other reasons apart from the content of its code that explain Dela-
ware’s continuing dominance. For other states have attempted to mimic 
Delaware’s corporate code,158 and although they have attracted a nontrivial 
number of reincorporations, they have not substantially lessened Dela-
ware’s preeminence.159 So various commentators have pointed to Dela-
                                                                                                                 
152 Fischel, 1987 S Ct Rev at 70 (cited in note 151) (suggesting that “competition among states 
creates a powerful tendency for states to enact laws that operate to the benefit of investors”). 
153 Even Lucian Bebchuk has conceded that “state competition produces a race for the top with re-
spect to some corporate issues.” Bebchuk, 105 Harv L Rev at 1440 (cited in note 147). See also id at 
1457; Macey and Miller, 65 Tex L Rev at 481 (cited in note 90) (“[T]he corporate federalists convin c-
ingly refute the implicit assumption of the reformist theory that legal rules which enhance the discretion 
of managers inevitably harm the welfare of shareholders.”). 
154 Ralph K. Winter, The “Race for the Top” Revisited: A Comment on Eisenberg, 89 Colum L Rev 
1526, 1529 (1989) (“In fact, the history of state antitakeover statutes may support the view that the race 
to the top is a leisurely walk.”). 
155 Romano, 61 Fordham L Rev at 848–49 (cited in note 151). See also Romano, 2 Theor Inq in L 
at 494–507 (cited in note 151); Romano, 8 Cardozo L Rev at 732–37 (cited in note 14). 
156 See generally Robert Daines, Does Delaware Law Improve Firm Value?, 62 J Fin Econ 525 
(2001).  
157 See, for example, Romano, 8 Cardozo L Rev at 752–53 (cited in note 14). 
158 See, for example, Jill E. Fisch, The Peculiar Role of the Delaware Courts in the Competition 
for Corp orate Charters, 68 U Cin L Rev 1061, 1067–68 (2000); Macey and Miller, 65 Tex L Rev at 488 
(cited in note 90); Romano, 1 J L, Econ, & Org at 246 (cited in note 14) (referring to Nevada as the 
“Delaware of the West”). 
159 See Demetrios G. Kaouris, Is Delaware Still a Haven for Incorporation? , 20 Del J Corp L 965, 
1011 (1995) (“Delaware remains the preeminent state for incorporation.”). See also 
<http://www.state.de.us/corp/index.htm> (visited Sept 25, 2001) (“More than 308,000 companies are in-
corporated in Delaware including 60 percent of the Fortune 500 and 50 percent of the companies listed 
on the New York Stock Exchange.”); Lucian Arye Bebchuk and Alma Cohen, Imperfect Competition 
and Agency Problems in the Market for Corporate Law table 2, working paper (2001), available online 
at <http://www.law.uchicago.edu/lawecon/index.html> (visited May 5, 2002). But see Marcel Kahan 
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ware’s credible commitment to continue to service corporate needs,160 its 
proficient judiciary, 161 the learning and network externalities growing out of 
the accumulation of experience with Delaware law,162 and the disincentive 
for other jurisdictions to innovate stemming from the ease with which 
Delaware could copy that innovation. 163 Both the learning and network ex-
ternalities phenomenon and the ability of Delaware to copy other states’ in-
novations, in particular, have been urged as bases for imperfection in the 
market for corporate charters.164 In this search for additional reasons for 
Delaware’s persistent prominence, however, scholars have not explored 
Delaware’s regulation of corporate political speech and the comparatively 
weaker position of its legislators to issue extortive threats as an integral 
component of its credible commitment to continue serving corporate needs.  
B. Corporate Political Speech and the Credible Commitment 
The traditional account of Delaware’s credible commitment, which is 
most closely associated with Professor Roberta Romano, focuses on Dela-
ware’s relative dependence on franchise tax revenue as well as its extensive 
                                                                                                                 
and Ehud Kamar, The Myth of State Competition in Corp orate Law, working paper (2002), available 
online at 
<http://www.law.berkeley.edu/institutes/law_econ/workingpapers/PDFpapers/kamar_spr02.pdf> (visited 
May 3, 2002) (suggesting that what exists in reality is a far cry from the vigorous state competition that 
the literature depicts). On managerial perceptions of differences (or lack thereof) across jurisdictions, 
see Romano, 1 J L, Econ, & Org at 269–70, 278 (cited in note 14).  
160 Romano, Genius of American Corporate Law at 37–38 (cited in note 14) (“Delaware’s preemi-
nence in the corporate charter market results from its ability to resolve credibly the commitment prob-
lem in relational contracting.”); Romano, 1 J L, Econ, & Org at  273–81 (cited in note 14); Romano, 8 
Cardozo L Rev at 721–24 (cited in note 14). 
161 Romano, 1 J L, Econ, & Org at 276–78 (cited in note 14). See also Fisch, 68 U Cin L Rev 1061 
(cited in note 158); Bernard S. Black, Is Corporate Law Trivial?: A Political and Economic Analysis, 84 
Nw U L Rev 542, 590 (1990). This is usually a reference to the Delaware Chancery Court, 75 percent of 
whose docket consists of corporate law cases. Alva, 15 Del J Corp L at 903 (cited in note 147). 
162 See Marcel Kahan and Michael Klausner, Standardization and Innovation in Corporate Co n-
tracting (or “The Economics of Boilerplate”), 83 Va L Rev 713, 763–64 (1997); Michael Klausner, 
Corporations, Corporate Law, and Networks of Contracts, 81 Va L Rev 757, 841–47 (1995). 
163 Bebchuk and Ferrell, 87 Va L Rev at 154–55 (cited in note 151). Delaware is quick to copy 
successful innovations, William J. Carney, The Production of Corporate La w, 71 S Cal L Rev 715, 741–
42 (1998) (“Delaware is not the first mover on most corporate law changes, but a quick follower of suc-
cessful innovations.”), though not innovations that stymie takeovers, Romano, 2 Theor Inq in L at 531–
32 (cited in note 151) (“[I]n contrast to its position as an innovator of corporation code provisions, 
Delaware has persistently been a laggard behind other states in the takeover statute context.”). 
164 On the latter, see Bebchuk and Ferrell, 87 Va L Rev at 154–55 (cited in note 151): 
Consider the decision of Montana whether to make a major commitment to developing a better 
takeover regime with the attendant judicial and legal infrastructure that  would be a necessary pre-
requisite. Montana might reason that if it develops such a regime and makes the necessary invest -
ments, then Delaware might just match these developments.  
For a general discussion of the former, see Marcel Kahan and Ehud Kamar, Price Discrimination in the 
Market for Corporate Law, 86 Cornell L Rev 1205 (2001); Ehud Kamar, A Regulatory Competition 
Theory of Indeterminacy in Corporate Law, 98 Colum L Rev 1908 (1998). But see Romano, 2 Theor 
Inq in L at 507–26 (cited in note 151). 
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and sunk investment in legal and judicial capital. 165 The idea is that this de-
pendence and investment is pledged as a hostage, as it were, to signal a se-
rious commitment to maintain a high-quality corporate code.166 But this ac-
count represents an oversimplif ication of the political process. Individual 
legislators cannot fully internalize the benefits of increased tax revenues, 
which are in effect a public good,167 and this is true even if the state is small 
and increasing revenue without a corresponding increase in local taxes 
tends to favor the reelection of incumbents. Yet much of the existing litera-
ture simply assumes that the behavior of the relevant individual lawmakers 
will be shaped by the collective state interest in attracting incorporations.168 
This section assimilates the McChesney economic model of regulation into 
the corporate regulatory competition debate. In so doing, this section further 
develops the existing literature’s application of the traditional model. The 
aim is to offer a more nuanced approach to evaluating the comparative ad-
vantage in the competition for corporate charters provided by Delaware’s 
unique political economy.  
The starting point is the observation that the extortion-based political 
economy of the Tillman Act and its state analogues offered earlier is consis-
tent with Delaware’s not similarly discriminating against corporate political 
speech.169 Extortive threats by Delaware legislators against firms with their 
                                                                                                                 
165 See Romano, 1 J L, Econ, & Org at 273–81 (cited in note 14); Romano, 8 Cardozo L Rev at 
721–24 (cited in note14); Romano, Genius of American Corporate Law at 37–44 (cited in note 14).  
166 Romano, 1 J L, Econ, & Org at 235–36, 240–41 (cited in note 14) (stating that “these states are 
hostages to their own success” and producing data to support this proposition); Romano, Genius of 
American Corporate Law at 38–39 (cited in note 14). For a general discussion, see Oliver E. William-
son, The Economic Institutions of Capitalism 163–205 (Free Press 1985). 
167 See Fischel, 1987 S Ct Rev at 69 (cited in note 151) (“From the perspective of individual state 
legislators, increased revenue from franchise taxes is something of a public good.”); William J. Carney, 
The Political Economy of Competition for Corporate Charters, 26 J Legal Stud 303, 308 (1997) (“Leg-
islators will face a trade-off between increasing franchise fee revenues by attracting and retaining corpo-
rate chartering revenues with a low-cost statute free of interest group deals, on the one hand, and in-
creasing political support from interest groups, on the other.”). 
168 Professor Fischel has made this observation about the literature generally, see Fischel, 1987 S 
Ct Rev at 69 (cited in note 151), and Professor Coffee has made a similar observation regarding Profes-
sor Romano in particular, John C. Coffee, Jr., The Future of Corporate Federa lism: State Competition 
and the New Trend toward De Facto Federal Minimum Standards, 8 Cardozo L Rev 759, 761–62 
(1987), though elsewhere Romano has embraced an interest -group-based approach. See, for example, 
Romano, 2 Theor Inq in L at 533–34 (cited in note 151); Romano, 73 Va L Rev at 122–37 (cited in note 
151). Still, the assumption animates much of the literature, see, for example, Bebchuk, 105 Harv L Rev 
at 1454 (cited in note 147) (“[T]he appropriate assumption is that a state’s interest in attracting incorpo-
rations shapes the behavior of the individuals actually involved in the state’s lawmaking process.”), 
though not all of it, see, for example, Carney, 26 J Legal Stud 303 (cited in note 167). 
169 Note, however, that to say that there is no discrimination against corporations is not to say that 
there are no limits on them. The same contribution and expenditure rules that apply to anyone else in 
Delaware apply to corporations as well. See 15 Del Code Ann § 8023 (1999) (governing independent 
expenditures); 15 Del Code Ann § 8010 (1999) (governing contributions to candidates). See also note 3. 
So it would perhaps be better to say that in Delaware, corporations face a more even playing field than, 
say, on the federal level. Corporations in Delaware, like natural persons, need only identify themselves 
as the sponsor of an independent expenditure; and corporations may make contributions to political 
campaigns in the same amounts as natural persons. In contrast, corporations may make no contributions 
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physical assets elsewhere but that are incorporated in Delaware are less 
credible than similar extortive threats by legis lators in other states. Credible 
extortive threats require independent alternative consumers of legislation,170 
and with respect to corporate law, Delaware legislators have few alternative 
interest group sponsors.171 On the federal level and in most other states, in 
contrast, there are numerous interest groups that regularly compete with 
managers on corporate law issues, perhaps most importantly labor.172 Thus, 
just as the lack of competing lobbies in Delaware means that investors and 
managers need not fear efforts by others to obtain legislative rents at their 
expense through the enactment of private interest provisions in the corpo-
rate code (the traditional economic model of regulation),173 the lack of com-
peting lobbies in Delaware means that investors and managers need not 
worry about extortive ultimatums by Delaware politicians either (the 
McChesney model). In New York, however, not only is there exposure to 
rent seeking by labor unions in the form of, say, large-shareholder statutory 
liability for employee wages,174 but there is also exposure to rent extraction 
by politicians in the form of threats to enact such provisions.175 All else be-
ing equal, Delaware therefore offers a friendlier environment. Managers 
may directly agitate for amendments to the corporate code without exposure 
to either traditional rent seeking by other lobbies or McChesney-style rent 
extraction by politicians. 
In reply one might argue that if Delaware legislators have nowhere 
else to turn, they will focus their rent extraction on corporations. But such 
efforts would be hampered by the lack of leverage stemming from the ab-
sence of alternative interest group patrons. This contrary story is also incon-
                                                                                                                 
or even independent expenditures in connection with federal elections. 2 USC § 441b (1994). The rela-
tive effect of the generally applicable contribution limit in Delaware contained in 15 Del Code Ann § 
8010(a), moreover, is tempered by 15 Del Code Ann § 8010(b), which imposes relatively narrow caps 
on the ability of political parties to aid Delaware candidates. The only other relevant provision in Dela-
ware is 15 Del Code § 8012(e) (1999), which is something of a veil-piercing rule. Corporate donations 
will be charged against the individual contribution limits of any shareholder owning in excess of 50 per-
cent of the company’s stock. 
170 See McChesney, Money for Nothing at 38–41 (cited in note 13) (discussing different forms of 
political credibility and political opportunism). 
171 See Coffee, 8 Cardozo L Rev at 762–63 (cited in note 168) (“Another distinctive fact about 
Delaware as a jurisdiction is the relative absence of countervailing lobbies.”); Macey and Miller, 65 Tex 
L Rev at 490 (cited in note 90). 
172 As Professor Yadlin observes, the popular voting power of the members of these lobbies adds 
to their power and to the credibility of a legislative threat to align with their interests. Yadlin, 69 U Chi L 
Rev at 1174–76 (cited in note 80). 
173 See Coffee, 8 Cardozo L Rev at 762–63 (cited in note 168); Carney, 26 J Legal Stud at 308 
(cited in note 167). 
174 NY Bus Corp L § 630 (McKinney 1986). See Coffee, 8 Cardozo L Rev at 762–63 (cited in note 
168). 
175 That the movement to restrict direct corporate campaign contributions first began in New York 
and on the federal level—and that it was in these jurisdictions that corporate interventions at the turn of 
the century were at their most massive—lends further support to the anti-extortion basis for the statutes 
suggested in Part II.  
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sistent with Romano’s hostage analysis. Once again the traditional and 
McChesney economic models of regulation converge with mirror-image 
analyses. Just as Delaware lawmakers “risk[ ] killing the proverbial goose 
that laid the golden egg” by adopting too much private interest law,176 they 
would similarly risk the incorporation business by engaging in extortive ul-
timatums—and Delaware lawmakers take a uniquely long-term perspective 
on the necessity of preserving the state’s incorporation business.177 More-
over, even if corporate law scholars and sophisticated investors can articu-
late good reasons for Delaware’s  continued corporate law dominance, 
Delaware nevertheless faces an ongoing potential popular legitimacy prob-
lem. A Delaware campaign donation frenzy—whether sparked by tradi-
tional interest group rent seeking or by McChesney-style political rent ex-
traction—risks giving popular salience to the question of the propriety of 
Delaware’s ongoing corporate law hegemony and thus risks a consequent 
increased possibility of federalization. 178 
Alternatively, against this one might argue that there are competing in-
terests in Delaware, such as its legal community. 179 But the core interest of 
the Delaware bar is in preserving Delaware as the dominant place of incor-
poration. 180 Institutional investors, too, are powerful. But their interest in 
Delaware legislation is similarly tied to the ability of Delaware lawmakers 
to keep large corporations incorporated there, and the selling of their shares 
will often be a sounder strategy towards change than lobbying a state legis-
lature. In short, “satellite industries” cannot provide extortive leverage, be-
cause their Delaware orbit is a function of the strength of Delaware’s gravi-
tational pull on out-of-state firms.181  
                                                                                                                 
176 Macey and Miller, 65 Tex L Rev at 505 (cited in note 90) (noting this constraint on Delaware in 
the related context of its willingness to placate the lawyer lobby). See also Carney, 26 J Legal Stud at 
308 (cited in note 167) (“Delaware faces high elasticity of demand for efficient corporate laws and rela-
tively low elasticity of demand for private benefits, except from corporate lawyers. Under these condi-
tions, Delaware will attempt to maximize the chartering of foreign enterprises, subject to provision of 
some benefits to corporate lawyers.”); Coffee, 8 Cardozo L Rev at 764 (cited in note 168) (observing 
that private-interest lawmaking in Delaware is “subject to the obvious limitation that, if the Delaware 
law were made unattractive to corporations, the corporate migration to Delaware will end”). 
177 See, for example, Leo E. Strine, Jr., Delaware’s Corporate-Law System: Is Corporate America 
Buying an Exquisite Jewel or a Diamond in the Rough?: A Response to Kahan & Kamar’s Price Dis-
crimination in the Market for Corporate Law, 86 Cornell L Rev 1257, 1268–71 (2001). 
178 Compare Coffee, 8 Cardozo L Rev at 764 (cited in note 168) (observing that in the 1970s, 
when federal intervention “was a real prospect,” Delaware lawmakers responded accordingly). See also 
Fischel, 76 Nw U L Rev at 923–45 (cited in note 147) (suggesting that the Delaware courts responded to 
Cary’s original criticism of Delaware). 
179 See Carney, 26 J Legal Stud at 306–07 (cited in note 167) (“Two interest groups have domi-
nated the development of American corporate law—corporate lawyers and corporate managers.”). 
180 See Romano, 2 Theor Inq in L at 534 (cited in note 151); Macey and Miller, 65 Tex L Rev at 
505 (cited in note 90); Coffee, 8 Cardozo L Rev at 764 (cited in note 168). See also Larry E. Ribstein, 
Delaware, Lawyers, and Contractual Choice of Law, 19 Del J Corp L 999, 1007–17 (1994). 
181 Coffee, 8 Cardozo L Rev at 762–64 (cited in note 168).  
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In Delaware, moreover, with the possible exception of takeover stat-
utes—it is home to both potential bidders and targets—corporate demand 
for legislation is more or less homogeneous in the weak sense that it is lim-
ited to an interest in corporate law. This is not to say that all managers of 
Delaware corporations want precisely identical law. In fact, we know that 
they do not, as evidenced by the move towards a highly enabling and per-
missive code full of default rules.182 Rather, the point is that Delaware is not 
in the business of regulating the ongoing business activities of the firms it 
charters, so a Delaware legislator cannot pit one set of managers against 
another by threatening activity regulation.183 Importantly, the overwhelming 
majority of firms incorporated in Delaware have their operating units and 
physical assets elsewhere. Hence their interest in Delaware lawmaking ex-
tends only to the extent of its corporate law, and the reach of Delaware with 
regard to these companies likewise extends only to the regulation of their 
internal affairs.184 This means that Delaware is not a likely forum for lobby-
ing by firms for legislation that transfers wealth between them. To repeat, 
Delaware’s contact with most firms is limited to the provision of corporate 
law. In contrast, a federal legislator who sits on a committee that superin-
tends, say, the telecommunications industry, could pit MCI aga inst AT&T 
and hold up both for donations. Thus, even though in a typical jurisdiction 
from a corporate perspective the Tillman Act and its state law counterparts 
might be desirable because they partially shield corporations from rent 
seeking by competitors and rent extraction by politicians,185 that dynamic is 
not present in the unique political environment of Delaware. Similar shield-
ing in Delaware is therefore unnecessary. Moreover, in the absence of a po-
litical dynamic that requires shielding from the rent seeking of competitors 
and rent extraction by politicians, corporations do better without discrimi-
nation against corporate political speech. As discussed below, this facilitates 
lobbying for the occasional necessary amendment to the corporate code.186 
Against this, Professor Omri Yadlin suggests that, even if Delaware is 
not in the business of activity regulation, the prior paragraph’s weak as-
sumption of homogeneity is false even within the demand for corporate law. 
Hence, Professor Yadlin suggests that Delaware legislators could attempt to 
“divide and conquer” by introducing amendments on divisive issues of cor-
porate law.187 But that threat is more hypothetical than real. There is a strong 
legislative norm in Delaware in favor of deference to the Corporate Law 
Section of the Bar Association,188 and amendments to the Delaware General 
                                                                                                                 
182 Yadlin, 69 U Chi L Rev at 1179–80 (cited in note 80). 
183 See McChesney, Money for Nothing at 55–66 (cited in note 13). 
184 Compare Macey and Miller, 65 Tex L Rev at 490 (cited in note 90). 
185 See Parts II.B and II.D. 
186 See Part III.C. 
187 Yadlin, 69 U Chi L Rev at 1176–80 (cited in note 80). 
188 Alva, 15 Del J Corp L at 904–16 (cited in note 147); Andrew G.T. Moore, II, State Competition, 
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Corporation Law are recommended only “when there is a demonstrable 
consensus in the corporate community that such changes are advisable.”189 
It is therefore likely that none of Professor Yadlin’s hypothetical divide-
and-conquer proposals would ever get before the legislature. In effect, is-
sues of Delaware corporate law for which there is no strong consensus—the 
sort of issues that would invite rent seeking and political rent extraction—
are punted to the Delaware courts. This further reduces the potential for 
both traditional rent seeking and McChesney-style political rent extrac-
tion.190  
Moreover, the constitutional requirement in Delaware of a two-thirds 
vote of both houses of the legislature to amend the General Corporation 
Law also diminishes the credibility of extortive threats generally and the 
likelihood of a divide-and-conquer strategy in particular.191 In conjunction 
with the strong norm of deference to the Corporate Law Council of the state 
bar, that requirement cuts the legs out from under an extortive threat made 
by an individual or by a small group of legislators, because it ensures that 
the status quo is relatively stable.192 True, the two-thirds requirement might 
make more credible a threat to hold out once legislation is on the precipice 
of passage.193 But such an ex post holdout threat is less likely than simple ex 
ante extortion, because the ex post threat is highly visible and subject to 
sanction in internal Delaware politics.194 Furthermore, as an empirical mat-
ter, the ex post holdout problem has not materialized. Delaware has had no 
trouble making swift amendments to its corporate code.195 
                                                                                                                 
Panel Response, 8 Cardozo L Rev 779, 780–81 (1987). See also Romano, 2 Theor Inq in L at 534 (cited 
in note 151); Romano, 73 Va L Rev at 141 (cited in note 151). 
189 Strine, 86 Cornell L Rev at 1268–70 (cited in note 177) (“In areas where a consensus emerges . 
. . Delaware’s Corporate Law Council will generally draft and obtain swift passage of legislative 
amendments. When there is no consensus, however, they will not.”). Indeed, this norm further curtails 
legislative avenues for extortion by reducing the likelihood of committee hearings and other legislative 
functions that facilitate shakedowns. Compare McChesney, Money for Nothing at 39–40 (cited in note 
13). 
190 Fisch, 68 U Cin L Rev at 1092–94 (cited in note 158); Macey and Miller, 65 Tex L Rev at 500–
02 (cited in note 90). Of course, this requires a high level of trust in the quality of the Delaware judici-
ary, a point made by Professor Yadlin, 69 U Chi L Rev at 1186 (cited in note 80), and explored in greater 
detail by Professor Fisch, 68 U Cin L Rev at 1068 (noting Delaware’s “sp ecialized and expert judiciary 
which provides both rapid and high quality litigation decisions”). 
191 Del Const Art IX, § 1 (“No general incorporation law, nor any special act of incorporation, 
shall be enacted without the concurrence of two-thirds of all the members elected to each House of the 
General Assembly.”). See Romano, 1 J L, Econ, & Org at 241–42, 273–79 (cited in note 14); Romano, 8 
Cardozo L Rev at 721–22 (cited in note 14). 
192 See Macey and Miller, 65 Tex L Rev at 489 (cited in note 90) (“[C]orporations need not fear 
that Delaware will change its perspective on corporate law whenever there are small changes in the po-
litical complexion of the state legislature.”). 
193 Yadlin, 69 U Chi L Rev at 1186 (cited in note 80). 
194 Compare id at 1185 (cited in note 80) (stating that Delaware has “a large constituency whose 
main interest is in expanding the number of firms incorporated in Delaware”).  
195 See Carney, 71 S Cal L Rev at 741–42 (cited in note 163) (noting that Delaware is “a quick fol-
lower of successful innovations”); Macey and Miller, 65 Tex L Rev at 489 (cited in note 90) (“At the 
same time, a blocking minority is unlikely to develop to stop needed changes in response to unforeseen 
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That Delaware corporations might still be subject to political rent ex-
traction by legislators in the jurisdictions in which the corporation locates 
its operating units does not undermine this analysis. The claim here is not 
that incorporation in Delaware somehow insulates the corporation from po-
litical rent extraction everywhere. Rather, the claim is that with respect to 
corporate law, Delaware is desirable because it does not discriminate 
against corporate political speech and yet extortive ultimatums concerning 
corporate lawmaking are unlikely. Thanks to the internal affairs doctrine, 
the decision where to incorporate need not be tied to the decision where to 
locate the physical assets of the firm. So firms make the decision where to 
locate their operating units independently of the decision where to incorpo-
rate. The potential for legislative rent extraction thus becomes one of many 
relevant factors in each separate decision. Delaware’s responsive corporate 
lawmaking process and its reduced likelihood of political rent extraction re-
garding corporate law are relevant and attractive considerations in favor of 
Delaware when making the incorporation decision. 
C. The Social Welfare Effect 
The foregoing analysis reveals a positive social welfare consequence 
of corporate law federalism. Occasional amendments to the relevant gov-
erning corporate code (highly enabling and permissive though it may be) 
are a necessary input for firms that assume the corporate form. The combi-
nation of few competing bidders and the failure to discriminate against cor-
porate political speech lowers the cost of that input, if not by increasing the 
avenues through which it might be purchased, then by offering a jurisdic-
tion in which reform may be sought without exposure to extortionate de-
mands. Put another way, Delaware’s political dynamic not only protects 
corporations from extortive threats, but it also increases the odds of suc-
cessfully agitating for legislative changes to Delaware’s corporate law 
without triggering a cascade of rent extraction. This is an appealing charac-
teristic of Delaware, because from time to time legislative amendment to 
the corporate code will improve shareholder welfare. For an illustration, 
one need only think of Smith v Van Gorkom and section 102(b)(7) of the 
Delaware code.196 In a sense, the debate over campaign finance laws may be 
viewed as an empirical question about the scope of rent extraction versus 
the informative value of lobbying activity. In Delaware, the informative 
value of lobbying activity appears to outweigh the potential costs of rent ex-
traction. 
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True, the magnitude of this effect may be diminished by the practice of 
deference to the bar in corporate law matters, because that practice lessens 
the need to lobby the legislature directly. And as Professor Yadlin observes, 
the constitutional requirement of a two-thirds majority to amend the Dela-
ware General Corporation Law might provide a countervailing force to-
wards an increased price for legislative amendments.197 But it remains true 
that initiating a revision to the Delaware General Corporation Law does not 
invite extortive ultimatums in the same way that it would in New York or in 
other more populous jurisdictions. Moreover, as a practical matter, the like-
lihood of Delaware legislators using the two-thirds requirement as leverage 
to increase the price of corporate legislation is small. When there is “de-
monstrable consensus in the corporate community” in favor of an amend-
ment, it is recommended by the bar and swiftly enacted.198 
The more troublesome objection to this analysis is that in light of the 
shareholder/manager agency problem, Delaware’s unique setup might fa-
cilitate management’s ability to obtain law detrimental to shareholder wel-
fare. An apposite analogy would be to lowering the price of burglary tools 
by making that market more efficient. There are, however, at least three 
problems with this argument. First, to premise a social welfare analysis on 
the assumption that regulatory competition results in law that harms share-
holders is to assume significant failure in the capital markets and runs con-
trary to the empir ical studies showing otherwise. As Professor Robert 
Daines has recently shown, Delaware law improves firm value.199 There 
remain, of course, arguments against accepting this implication of Daines’s 
and related empirical studies—for example, the argument that incorporating 
in Delaware might improve firm value because of network effects or other 
factors unrelated to Delaware’s code.200 But none “refute[s] the empirical 
findings that Delaware law and, hence, competition for charters have pro-
vided shareholders with economic benefits.”201 
Second, the ability of managers to make direct donations to Delaware 
legislators without exposure to extortive ultimatums has not, as a historical 
matter, led to managerial hijacking of Delaware’s legislative process to the 
detriment of shareholders. Takeover statutes provide a good case study, be-
cause those dubious of regulatory competition are especially fearful about 
excessive takeover protection.202 In contrast to states like Connecticut, Mas-
sachusetts, and North Carolina, each of which enacted specific statutory 
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takeover impediments at the behest of the managers of a single local com-
pany, 203 there has been no comparable enactment in Delaware. In fact, with 
regard to statutory takeover protection generally, “Delaware has persistently 
been a laggard behind other states.”204 Thus the disciplining force of capital 
markets, the diversity of opinion on the takeover issue, the unwillingness of 
the Delaware bar to recommend amendments without “demonstrable con-
sensus,” and/or some confluence of these and other elements of Delaware’s 
political economy appear not to have facilitated a deluge of pro-
management legislation in Delaware,205 and this despite the lack of dis-
crimination against corporate political speech. The analogy to lowering the 
price of burglary tools, in other words, does not hold up. The experience 
thus far in Delaware suggests that its political economy—including the lack 
of discrimination against corporate political speech coupled with the 
unlikely prospect of political rent extraction—is amenable to swift enact-
ment of amendments that promote shareholder welfare, but not to enact-
ment of legislation designed to benefit management at the expense of 
shareholders. 
Finally, even if competition between the states did push towards law 
detrimental to shareholder welfare (though both rigorous and casual empir i-
cism regarding the Delaware experience suggests the contrary), it would 
still be in shareholders’ best interests for the purchase of that law to be free 
from minatory legislators. Legislative extortion would only exacerbate the 
problem, because at some level the demand for corporate law is inelastic—
it is necessary for any firm wishing to incorporate. No good comes from in-
troducing a second set of faithless agents to the transaction. That would 
simply double the potential sources of agency costs to be borne by share-
holders. 
                                                                                                                 
203 Robert M. Daines, Do Classified Boards Affect Firm Value?: Takeover Defenses after the Poi-
son Pill at  10–12, working paper (2001) (on file with author) (Massachusetts: Norton Company); First 
Union Is Seeking Change in State Law over Wachovia Deal, Wall St J A10 (June 14, 2001) (North Caro-
lina: First Union and Wachovia); Carrick Mollenkamp, First Union Added by North Carolina with Fast 
New Law, Wall St J B2 (June 14, 2001) (same); Floyd Norris, Southern Levitation: Battling Banks’ 
Shares Keep Rising , NY Times C1 (July 27, 2001) (same); Romano, 73 Va L Rev at 122–37 (cited in 
note 151) (Connecticut: Aetna Insurance). For a general discussion, see Henry N. Butler, Corporation-
Specific Antitakeover Statutes and the Market for Corporate Charters, 1988 Wis L Rev 365. 
204 Romano, 2 Theor Inq in L at 531–32 (cited in note 151). As Vice Chancellor Strine has ob-
served:  
[L]awyers from several states are presently marketing the fact that their state corporation laws al-
low “bulletpoof” antitakeover defensive measures, whereas Delaware’s does not. Why has Dela-
ware not responded in kind? . . . I would suggest that Delaware has not responded because self-
interested Delawareans believe that a more balanced approach is essential to maintain their com-
petitive advantage.  
Strine, 86 Cornell L Rev at 1269 (cited in note 177) (footnote omitted). 
205 See Romano, 2 Theor Inq in L at 533–34 (cited in note 151). 
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IV.   EXTENSIONS AND IMPLICATIONS 
This Part discusses the implications for three current policy debates of 
shifting the focus over corporate political speech from the share-
holder/manager agency problem to the society/lawmaker agency problem. 
First, Part IV.A briefly discusses the current political debate about banning 
corporate (and other) soft-money donations.206 Second, Part IV.B briefly 
discusses the current academic debate about issuer choice of law in securi-
ties regulation. Third, Part IV.C offers a comprehensive analysis of the cur-
rent academic debate over whether to enact an optional federal corporate 
takeover law. This more comprehensive analysis may be viewed as a case 
study, as it were, in the application of this Article’s analysis to other prob-
lems. 
A. Soft-money Bans 
The foregoing analysis suggests at least two related points for the cur-
rent political debate about whether to ban corporate soft-money donations. 
First, protecting shareholders from managerial disloyalty is not a good pol-
icy justification for banning soft-money donations. The debate should focus 
instead on the impact, if any, of a soft-money ban on corporate rent seeking 
and political rent extraction.  
Second, the foregoing analysis may help explain the counterintuitive 
recent endorsement by numerous corporate executives of a ban on corporate 
soft-money donations.207 It may also help explain the similarly counterintui-
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tive announcement by a number of large corporations, including General 
Motors, Ford Motors, Monsanto, Time Warner, Dell, Cisco, and IBM, that 
they will forbear from making soft-money donations.208 Massive soft-
money donations were largely unknown before the 1988 Bush-Dukakis 
presidential election.209 Hence, it is not surprising that, several election cy-
cles later, managers are beginning to push towards having them banned and 
the argument includes an anti-extortion component. Indeed, there are strong 
parallels between the movement to ban soft-money today and the 1907 en-
actment of the Tillman Act. As detailed earlier, the Tillman Act was enacted 
in a burst of political entrepreneurship in the wake of publicly salient and 
rampant corporate interventions in the presidential election of 1904. These 
interventions represented an exaggerated application of a fundraising tech-
nique developed less than twenty years earlier. Similarly, McCain-Feingold 
and Shays-Meehan owe their passage in large part to political entrepreneur-
ship in the wake of publicly salient and rampant corporate soft-money do-
nations that represent an exaggerated application of a fundraising technique 
more or less invented in 1988.  
Both the collective action dynamic identified in Part II.B and the ex-
tortion dynamic identified in Part II.D are discernible in the rhetoric of to-
day’s soft-money debate. Evidence of the former includes statements by 
managers that “[m]ost business today would prefer not to give. But there’s 
not going to be unilateral disarmament.”210 With regard to the latter, con-
sider the following excerpt from an editorial by Edward Kangas, then the 
Global Chairman of Deloitte Touche Tohmatsu, published in 1999 by the 
New York Times: 
What has been called legalized bribery looks like extortion to us. . . . I 
know from personal experience and from other executives that it’s not 
easy saying no to appeals for cash from powerful members of Con-
gress or their operatives. Congress can have a major impact on bus i-
nesses. . . . The threat may be veiled, but the message is clear: failing 
to donate could hurt your company. 211 
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Kangas’s argument strongly implies that an extortion dynamic similar 
to that which helped prompt the Tillman Act is at work today. More gener-
ally, when evaluating modern proposals for campaign finance reform as 
remedies for the society/lawmaker agency problem, not only should the 
proposals’ predicted effects on rent seeking (in the classic model) be con-
sidered, but so should the predicted effects on political rent extraction (in 
the McChesney model). Additional insight is available, in other words, 
from drawing on both traditional and modern learning on the economic the-
ory of regulation. 212 Putting the effect, if any, of banning soft-money on rent 
seeking by interest groups to one side, the analysis of Part II suggests that 
an additional argument in favor of a corporate soft-money ban is that it 
would enhance shareholder welfare by making more difficult the extraction 
by legislators of large corporate soft-money donations. This argument, of 
course, is not a show-stopper. The market will eventually find a way to 
clear,213 and the substituted approach may be even less desirable. Consider 
that the use of corporate PACs to evade the Tillman Act means that many 
corporate donations today are subject to fewer corporate governance checks 
than they would have been without the Tillman Act.214 Still, analysis of the 
political economy of the venerable discrimination against corporate politi-
cal speech helps illuminate additional considerations relevant to the current 
debate about whether to enact a ban on corporate soft-money donations. 
B. Issuer Choice in Securities Regulation 
There is a burgeoning scholarly debate over issuer choice of law in se-
curities regulation.215 In particular, several scholars have proposed changing 
the choice of law rule for securities transactions so that the parties could 
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choose the law that would govern their transaction.216 The basic idea, most 
clearly evident in Professor Roberta Romano’s proposal, is to engender a 
securities law regulatory competition similar to that for corporate law. The 
underlying theory is that, just as shareholders have benefited from corporate 
law regulatory competition, investors would similarly benefit from a securi-
ties law regulatory competition. 217 Indeed, Romano has self-consciously 
embraced the analogy,  
because the interests and incentives in the two settings are similar: the 
object of protection of both regimes is the financial interest of inves-
tors, and under competition, investors’ preferences will dictate the 
choice of regulator because insiders who require investment capital 
will bear the higher capital cost of an investor-unfriendly regime 
choice.218  
Without getting embroiled in the details of the various proposals, there 
is an important insight for this debate to be found in Part III. For a securities 
law regulatory competition experiment completely to replicate the success 
of the corporate law experience, more will be needed than just a mandatory 
federal rule compelling a securities law equivalent to the internal affairs 
doctrine.219 A state, presumably Delaware, will need to replicate the various 
institutional features of Delaware’s corporate lawmaking process that en-
sure the rapid enactment of needed reforms without vulnerability either to 
classic rent seeking or to McChesney-style political rent extraction. Those 
features evolved over time, thanks to the natural competitive pressures of 
the market for corporate charters. The development of a similar market for 
securities regulation, however, was blocked by the 1933 and 1934 Acts.220 
So an important question is whether the institutional features of Delaware 
that keep many of the public choice legislative pathologies in check could 
develop in a securities law regulatory competition if one were initiated to-
day. 
This is not a trivial point. The high-stakes securities law equivalent of 
corporate takeover protection is class action securities fraud litigation. 
Therefore it should not be surprising that there is strong anecdotal evidence 
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of substantial political rent extraction (in the McChesney model) and/or in-
terest group rent seeking (in the traditional model) in connection with the 
most recent federal securities law reforms—the Securities Litigation Uni-
form Standards Act of 1998 and the Private Securities Litigation Reform 
Act of 1995. 221 It is similarly unsurprising that the same kind of evidence 
exists concerning California’s contemporaneous Proposition 211, which 
would have revised California’s blue sky laws.222 Two points should be 
made here. 
First, the potential upside to a securities law regulatory competition is 
substantial, not only because it may benefit investors for all the same rea-
sons that corporate regulatory competition has benefited investors, but also 
because the public choice pathologies that Delaware has managed to min i-
mize in corporate law appear to plague the current system of securities 
regulation. Opening the regulation of securities to jurisdictional competition 
creates the possibility of competitive forces pushing a jurisdiction towards 
the evolution of a political economy in which these pathologies are simi-
larly minimized. Second, even though the potential benefits are high, the 
costs of the process by which the experiment would be put into place will 
likely be high as well. Consider the likely scope of the deadweight losses 
from the rent seeking and political rent extraction that would be prompted 
by any debate on the requisite federal implementing legislation. Because 
many of the relevant interest groups (such as the plaintiffs’ bar and financial 
intermediaries) are now well organized, there is risk of their distorting any 
jurisdiction’s efforts to replicate the salutary institutional features of Dela-
ware’s corporate lawmaking process—efforts that would be directed at sty-
mieing their influence.  
These problems need not be resolved here. The point is to flag them 
for future study. The benefits to shareholders of corporate regulatory com-
petition are so clear as to make out a prima facie case for experimenting 
with a similar regulatory competition in securities law. But before moving 
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towards that experiment, it will be worth giving attention to the political 
economy considerations relevant to the enactment of the requisite federal 
implementing legislation as well as the political economy of the underlying 
jurisdictional competition that would ensue. 
C. Optional Federal Takeover Law 
The foregoing analysis also sets up a strong criticism of Lucian 
Bebchuk and Allen Ferrell’s recent proposal to enact a federal law of corpo-
rate takeovers.223 This criticism holds even if the federal regime were op-
tional, as they suggest it should be. The core of the Bebchuk and Ferrell 
proposal is an optional substantive federal takeover law coupled with a 
mandatory federal procedural law. Under the mandatory procedure, share-
holders of all corporations could choose between the otherwise applicable 
substantive state takeover law regime and the optional substantive federal 
law. Making the substance of the federal law optional is ingenious, because 
the option answers the objection that a mandatory federal law would stifle 
innovation and more generally would preempt choice.224 At the same time, 
making the shareholder choice procedure mandatory would in effect create 
a fifty-first regulatory regime that, at least so far as takeover law is con-
cerned, would compete with the fifty states.225 Hence, in Bebchuk and 
Ferrell’s view, even if one were to disagree with their contention that their 
optional federal law is indeed superior to Delaware’s, enactment of their 
proposal would be harmless. This last claim is their “so what?” defense: it 
allows them to reply with “so what?” to any argument that the substance of 
a federal regime will not be any better.226 
The problem with their proposal is that it is accompanied by only “a 
brief look” at the relevant political economy considerations.227 A closer look 
at those considerations as developed in this Article reveals a serious weak-
ness in their analysis, one that answers their “so what?” claim. Despite the 
optional character of their proposal,228 a closer look at the relevant political 
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economy considerations shows that there is still significant risk that it will 
diminish shareholder welfare.  
Before addressing the weaknesses in their “brief look” at the relevant 
political economy considerations, however, it will be worthwhile first to 
consider more generally their rejection of the efficacy of state competition 
in general. “Whether state competition overall creates pressure to adopt 
good or bad regulation,” write Bebchuk and Ferrell, “we would expect 
Delaware, the victorious state, to offer shareholders a somewhat better 
deal.”229 Thus, they write, “It might be that regulatory competition has 
pushed the states in a negative direction, with the victorious state, Dela-
ware, being slightly better than the others.”230 What is more, they contend, 
no state has the proper incentives to compete with Delaware, because 
Delaware could easily copy any innovation.231 Any state that tries will find 
itself merely serving as a stalking horse for improvements to Delaware law. 
That Delaware law could be “slightly better than the others,” however, 
is inconsistent with regulatory competition pushing “the states in a negative 
direction.” Recall that the argument why competition between the states 
might lead to bad law is that the interests of the consumers of that law, 
managers, are not sufficiently aligned with the interests of their princ i-
pals—shareholders.232 Thus the suppliers of that law, the states (or, more ac-
curately, the aggregation of all the individuals who are responsible for law-
making within the state), would cater to the preferences of managers.233 But 
if Delaware law is “slightly better than the others,” then managers are 
choosing law that is in fact the best for shareholders of what is available. 
Why would Delaware offer managers law that is “slightly better” than that 
of the other states if managers did not in fact desire better law? To concede 
that Delaware’s success is related to its offering law that is at least “slightly 
better than the others” is quite possibly to concede that there is at least a 
“leisurely walk” to the top. 234 
Of course Bebchuk and Ferrell would reply that they do not contend 
that there are no areas of corporate law in which regulatory competition 
pushes towards law that is beneficial for shareholders.235 Rather, their argu-
ment is that in areas in which the divergence of interests between share-
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235 Bebchuk and Ferrell, 87 Va L Rev at 130–32 (cited in note 151). See also Bebchuk, 105 Harv L 
Rev at 1440, 1457 (cited in note 147) (“To be sure, because the interests of managers and shareholders 
are somewhat aligned, there are many corporate issues with respect to which managers seek, and states 
in turn have an incentive to provide, rules that enhance shareholder value.”). 
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holder and managerial interest is especially acute—such as the law of take-
overs and takeover defenses—regulatory competition pushes towards law 
beneficial for managers rather than shareholders. In these areas states will 
cater to managerial rather than shareholder preferences, because it is on this 
dimension of the competition between the states that managers rest their re-
incorporation decisions.236 Thus, according to Bebchuk and Ferrell, the pro-
liferation of antitakeover statutes and case law permissive towards defen-
sive tactics such as the poison pill, far from being a temporary aberration, is 
in fact the natural consequence of regulatory competition. 237  
One might object to this analysis based on the fact that Delaware’s 
takeover statute is significantly less restrictive than most.238 One might also 
reply that recent scholarship suggests that the poison pill no longer makes 
much of a difference,239 and anyway Bebchuk and Ferrell’s discussion of the 
Delaware cases strangely omits important recent (and more restrictive) 
Delaware decisions regarding the poison pill. 240 The analysis here, however, 
will focus on a different point. Consider again the last two sentences of the 
prior paragraph, because they convey the ideas that form the basis for why 
in Bebchuk and Ferrell’s view federal intervention is so desirable.  
More than merely adding any old fifty-first regulatory regime to the 
competitive fray, their proposal would add a fifty-first competitor who by 
definition would be unresponsive to the reincorporation dynamic that in 
their view drives the states towards takeover defense permissiveness. In-
creased franchise tax revenues and the other benefits that flow to individual 
states from attracting incorporations would not accrue to the federal gov-
ernment upon the selection of its regime by the shareholders of a particular 
corporation. The federal government, in other words, has nothing to gain or 
lose from having its law chosen. Thus, Bebchuk and Ferrell contend, “the 
chances that federal officials would provide arrangements that are hospita-
ble to takeovers are higher than the probability that state officials would 
unilaterally do so.”241 So why not offer a federal option that, if it is indeed 
                                                                                                                 
236 Bebchuk and Ferrell, 87 Va L Rev at 133–35, 158 (cited in note 151); Bebchuk and Ferrell, 99 
Colum L Rev at 1197–99 (cited in note 151). See also Macey and Miller, 65 Tex L Rev at 470 (cited in 
note 90). 
237 Bebchuk and Ferrell, 87 Va L Rev at 131–32 (cited in note 151).  
238 Romano, 2 Theor Inq in L at 529–37 (cited in note 151). 
239 See Marcel Kahan and Edward B. Rock, How I Learned to Stop Worrying and Love the Pill: 
Adaptive Responses to Takeover Law, 69 U Chi L Rev 871 (2002). See also Romano, 2 Theor Inq in L at 
534–35 (cited in note 151); Jeffrey N. Gordon, Poison Pills and the European Case, 54 U Miami L Rev 
839, 841 (2000). 
240 Their discussion of the Delaware cases, see Bebchuk and Ferrell, 87 Va L Rev at 118–21 (cited 
in note 151), omits Paramount Communications, Inc v QVC Network, Inc, 637 A2d 34 (Del 1994), the 
most recent authorit ative statement of the Delaware Supreme Court, a statement that is less friendly to 
takeover defenses than their discussion allows. Also omitted in this context are Carmody v Toll Brothers, 
Inc, 723 A2d 1180, 1182 (Del Ch 1998) (invalidating a “dead hand” poison pill on both statutory and fi-
duciary duty grounds), and Mentor Graphics Corp v Quickturn Design Systems, Inc , 728 A2d 25, 25 
(Del Ch 1998) (invalidating a “no hand” poison pill of limited duration on fiduciary duty grounds). 
241 Bebchuk and Ferrell, 87 Va L Rev at 158–59 (cited in note 151). See also Bebchuk, 105 Harv L 
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more hospitable to takeovers than state law, shareholders can choose to opt 
into? If the federal option is not superior, then shareholders will simply de-
mur (the “so what?” defense).242 
The answer lies in the observation that Bebchuk and Ferrell fail to ad-
dress the fact that a federal takeover statute would not magically leap from 
the pages of their article (or from the British City Code on Takeovers and 
Mergers) into the United States Code. Any federal takeover statute would 
instead go through the normal federal legislative process. This makes it 
necessary to compare the political economy of the federal government to 
that of Delaware. An astonishing assumption of Bebchuk and Ferrell’s 
analysis is that the relevant individual federal lawmakers, in the absence of 
a collective federal interest in attracting opt-ins, will have no agenda in 
their lawmaking other than the public interest. That assumption is so crude 
as to call into question the validity of the conclusions that rest upon it. 
Bebchuk and Ferrell’s conception of the national legislative process is 
therefore open to two related criticisms—they are related in that they both 
question the validity of assuming public -regarding federal legislators—
though only the second, the one that is unique to this Article, clearly meets 
their “so what” claim.  
First, and this has been observed elsewhere, the collective action 
asymmetry between shareholders and managers that affords managers an 
advantage in lobbying would not disappear by nationalizing the relevant 
lawmaking forum. In other words, the federal legislative process is hardly 
immune to the very same political failure that “is the linchpin of Bebchuk 
and Ferrell’s critique of state competition.”243 Indeed, there is good reason 
to suppose that a federal statute would be worse, because with respect to 
takeovers the interests of labor converge with that of managers, and to-
gether they would present a formidable national lobby. 244 Still, this argu-
ment does not answer directly the Bebchuk and Ferrell response of, why not 
try? What have we to lose, they would say, if the substance of the federal 
law is optional?  
Second, and this is the criticism that grows out of this Article’s analy-
sis, Delaware legislators are uniquely unable to issue extortive ultimatums, 
something that cannot be said for federal legislators, precisely because fed-
eral legislators, unlike their state counterparts, would be unresponsive to the 
                                                                                                                 
Rev at 1500–01 (cited in note 147) (“In evaluating the relative performance of the federal law process, 
the best starting point is the observation that this process does not suffer from the structural biases that 
afflict the performance of state competition.”). 
242 Bebchuk and Ferrell, 87 Va L Rev at 149–50 (cited in note 151). 
243 Romano, 2 Theor Inq in L at 537–43 (cited in note 151). See also Choi and Guzman, 87 Va L 
Rev at 972–78 (cited in note 224); Roberta Romano, The Future of Hostile Takeovers: Legislation and 
Public Opinion , 57 U Cin L Rev 457, 468–85 (1988) (explaining why it would be a mistake to assume 
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244 Compare Coffee, 8 Cardozo L Rev at 762–63, 769–71 (cited in note 168) (discussing the likely 
influence of labor on takeover regulation). 
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reincorporation dynamic. Reincorporating in another state provides no es-
cape from federal law. So the fear of reincorporation provides no check 
against extortive threats by federal legislators. For exactly the reason that 
Bebchuck and Ferrell suppose that federal officials are more likely than 
state officials to supply law that is hospitable to takeovers—the lack of 
revenue consequences for federal lawmakers from shareholders’ opting in 
or out of the federal regime—federal officials could extort with impunity. 
And this is true, as we shall see in a moment, even if the statute’s substan-
tive provisions were optional. Thus, this criticism is an argument against 
even trying. It is an argument, in other words, that answers their “so what?” 
claim. 
Before turning to that point, however, we should reconnect these two 
strands of criticism. The commonality between them is the insight from the 
study of public choice that the “federal government” does not generate 
law—aggregations of individuals do. Bebchuk and Ferrell’s proposal 
strangely assumes that (i) these individuals have nothing personally to gain 
from federal takeover legislation and (ii) given this lack of personal interest, 
federal lawmakers will legislate in the public interest. These assumptions 
run counter to the classic economic theory of regulation and ignore the 
modern learning on that subject altogether. 
Given the ineffectiveness of reincorporation as a check on the behavior 
of federal legislators, from the perspective of the modern economic theory 
of regulation, a takeover proposal would be a fantastic “milker” bill for the 
extortion of campaign contributions and other forms of support.245 Casual 
empiricism confirms this worry: we have evidence of just this kind of po-
litical rent extraction from the 1980s takeover statute proposal. As Judge 
Douglas Ginsburg observed: 
As the Reagan Administration’s monitor of this legislation, I could 
only conclude at the time that, while the bills may not have been con-
ceived as milker bills, they were surely pursued as such once the 
members realized how lucrative they could be. Publicly traded corpo-
rations on both sides of the issue, which is to say tender offerors and 
takeover targets, began furiously throwing favors at the relevant Con-
gressmen for at least a few years while the threat (or promise) of legis-
lation seemed credible.246  
                                                                                                                 
245 Other terms besides “milker” that have been used include “cash cows,” “juice bills,” and 
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Moreover, the record of the federal government’s legislative process in 
the closely related context of securities fraud regulation is equally poor. 
Both the Securities Litigation Uniform Standards Act of 1998 and the Pri-
vate Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995 were passed in the wake of 
rampant donations, by no means merely cost-effective (from the donor’s 
perspective) rent seeking, by numerous interest groups.247 The legislative 
process in Delaware, with its heavy reliance on the Corporate Law Section 
of the Delaware Bar Association, is by contrast especially ill-suited to 
shakedowns and unlikely to trigger campaign donation frenzies. 
The Bebchuk and Ferrell proposal would be a “milker,” moreover, 
even if the substance of the proposed rules were optional. This is an answer 
to their claim that federal choice-enhancing legislation would do no harm. 
Federal legislators could simply threaten to make the option mandatory. As 
Professors Choi and Guzman have shown, federal regulators would likely 
push for just that,248 making the threat real. In contrast to Delaware, which 
requires a two-thirds legislative vote to enact corporate legislation and will 
consider such legislation only when it is put forward by the Bar Association 
based on demonstrable consensus, on the federal level a threat by a small 
group of legislators to amend the federal takeover statute would be more 
credible. Perversely, an optional statute might be worse than a mandatory 
one, because it would allow these legislators to threaten credibly to make it 
mandatory at a future time. 
 This claim should not be overread. It is not meant to suggest a tauto-
logical regress in which “mandatory rules are even worse than optional 
rules because legislators may threaten to turn them into optional rules 
(which are worse than mandatory rules)” and so on. 249 Rather, the claim has 
two components. First, an optional statute would double the number of ju-
risdictions whose takeover law could be relevant in a future takeover battle, 
so the lobbying efforts of all interested parties in the classic model would 
be doubled. If Bebchuk and Ferrell are correct that political failure on the 
state level leads to managerial lobbying for, and then legislative enactment 
of, takeover law that is detrimental to shareholder welfare, then all an op-
tional federal regime would do is double the aggregate amount of these 
deadweight rent seeking efforts—and half of it would be doubly wasteful, 
because only one takeover law regime would apply at any given moment.  
                                                                                                                 
value”). 
247 See note 221 and accompanying text. 
248 See Choi and Guzman, 87 Va L Rev at 977 (cited in note 224): 
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Second, with an optional federal takeover statute in place, the threat to 
enact a mandatory one becomes more credible, not in the trivial sense of re-
ducing the costs of drafting a mandatory proposal,250 but rather because it 
puts the issue on the political agenda and gives it popular salience. Al-
though it is undoubtedly correct in a theoretical sense that Bebchuk and 
Ferrell’s optional takeover statute would not actually give legislators the 
power to do anything more than they could do in the absence of such legis-
lation,251 legislators do not act in a vacuum. At any given moment the con-
fluence of innumerable political and other factors makes the threat of cer-
tain legislation more credible than others. For example, in the wake of the 
Enron scandal,252 threats to increase SEC oversight of the accounting pro-
fession are more credible than they were immediately before the scandal. 
Similarly, threats to enact price controls on health care services were more 
credible when the Clinton Administration made a national health care pro-
gram a political priority than they would be today. 253 The existence of an 
optional takeover statute would bring the federal government into the take-
over law game, and once that happened, threats to enact a mandatory ver-
sion would become more viable. Indeed, it is not difficult to imagine sig-
nificant layoffs in the wake of a well publicized hostile takeover of a com-
pany whose shareholders had opted for state law prompting calls for mak-
ing the federal statute both tougher and mandatory. In such an environment 
one would expect a rent seeking and political rent extraction frenzy similar 
to that of the 1980s takeover proposal and the 1995 and 1998 securities law 
reforms. 
In the end, a federal takeover regime, optional or not, would probably 
not offer shareholders any improvement. Moreover, its existence would 
double the number of jurisdictions in which the corporation would need to 
engage in lobbying and the number in which it would be vulnerable to rent 
seeking by others and political rent extraction by legislators. Put more gen-
erally, Bebchuk and Ferrell’s analysis focuses on the agency between man-
agers and shareholders without careful enough attention to the agency be-
tween citizens and their legislators—and what the study of public choice 
teaches about the latter agency relationship. Delaware’s political economy, 
in contrast to that of the federal government, is less conducive to transfers 
from shareholders to legislators. Unlike the agency between managers and 
shareholders, which is policed by the market in addition to fiduciary duties 
and elections, the agency between legislators and their constituents is 
checked only by imperfect elections.  
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CONCLUSION 
The underlying aim of this Article has been to shift the focus of the 
policy debate over corporate political speech from the shareholder/manager 
agency relationship to the agency relationship between lawmakers and so-
ciety. In view of that shifted focus, and drawing on a contractarian view of 
the firm, the economic theory of regulation, and the study of public choice, 
this Article explored the policy bases for, and the political economy of, the 
law’s ongoing discrimination against corporate political speech. This Arti-
cle also explored the relevance of the state law regulation of corporate po-
litical speech to the competition for corporate charters. Specifically, this Ar-
ticle advanced four points. 
First, this Article showed that the conventional justifications for dis-
criminating against corporate political speech are vulnerable to the extent 
that they depend on a divergence of interests between shareholders and 
managers. There is nothing special about managerial control over corporate 
political speech that warrants abandoning ordinary modes of corporate gov-
ernance in favor of a mandatory rule and criminalization. Indeed, the only 
plausible argument growing out of the conventional justifications for dis-
criminating against corporate political speech is a fear of corporate rent 
seeking. The corporate form may provide a comparative advantage in the 
market for legislation, and this might justify discriminating against corpo-
rate political speech. It is possible that corporations are especially perni-
cious seekers of rents through regulation. 
Second, this Article suggested a political economy story for the law’s 
ongoing and venerable discrimination against corporate political speech 
consistent with the prior claim that the corporate form might provide a 
comparative advantage in the market for legislation. This Article showed 
that the statutory regulation of corporate political speech was probably sup-
ported by corporations. To begin with, the statutes solve the collective ac-
tion problem if corporations as a class do better without lobbying. More 
importantly, these statutes provide partial shielding against political rent ex-
traction by legislators. Drawing on the relevant collective action dynamics, 
the economic theory of regulation (including the traditional and the modern 
learning on that subject), and a fresh look at the historical record, this Arti-
cle adduced argument and evidence in support of this analysis. 
Third, by assimilating the role of local campaign finance regulation 
into the corporate regulatory competition debate, this Article offered a more 
nuanced approach to evaluating the comparative advantages in the market 
for corporate charters provided by Delaware’s unique political economy. 
This Article suggested that Delaware’s lack of any corporation-specific 
campaign finance regulation, coupled with certain unique institutional fea-
tures of Delaware’s corporate lawmaking process, gives additional traction 
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to the credible commitment explanation for Delaware’s ongoing dominance 
in the market for corporate charters. 
Finally, this Article discussed the implications of the foregoing analy-
sis for three current policy debates. First, the Article briefly discussed the 
current political debate about banning corporate soft-money campaign do-
nations. Second, the Article briefly noted several analogous political econ-
omy issues relevant to the burgeoning academic debate about issuer choice 
of law in securities regulation. Third, the Article comprehensively analyzed 
the pertinence of the foregoing analysis for the current academic debate re-
garding the enactment of an optiona l federal corporate takeover regime. 
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